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Karol Horodecki, Michał Horodecki, Paweł Horodecki, Jonathan Oppenheim
Abstract
We develop a formalism for distilling a classical key from a quantum state in a systematic way, expanding on our previous
work on secure key from bound entanglement [K. Horodecki et. al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 94 (2005)]. More detailed proofs, discussion
and examples are provided of the main results. Namely, we demonstrate that all quantum cryptographic protocols can be recast
in a way which looks like entanglement theory, with the only change being that instead of distilling EPR pairs, the parties distill
private states. The form of these general private states are given, and we show that there are a number of useful ways of expressing
them. Some of the private states can be approximated by certain states which are bound entangled. Thus distillable entanglement
is not a requirement for a private key. We find that such bound entangled states are useful for a cryptographic primitive we call
a controlled private quantum channel. We also find a general class of states which have negative partial transpose (are NPT), but
which appear to be bound entangled. The relative entropy distance is shown to be an upper bound on the rate of key. This allows
us to compute the exact value of distillable key for a certain class of private states.
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I. INTRODUCTION
We often want to communicate with friends or strangers in private. Classically, this is impossible if we wish to communicate
over long distances, unless we have met before with our friend and exchanged a secret key which is as long as the message we
want to send. On the other hand, quantum cryptography allows two people to communicate privately with only a very short
key which is just used to authenticate the message.
Every quantum cryptographic protocol is equivalent to the situation where both parties (Alice and Bob) share some quantum
state ρAB , and then perform local operations on that state and engage in public communication (LOPC) to obtain a key which
is private from any eavesdropper. Until recently, every quantum protocol was also equivalent to distilling pure entanglement
from this shared state. I.e., achieving privacy was equivalent to the two parties converting many copies of the state ρAB , to a
smaller number of pure EPR pairs [23]
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), (1)
using local operations and classical communication (LOCC), and then performing a measurement on the EPR pairs in the
computational basis. Examples of such protocols include BB84 [7], [49], B92 [5], [51], and of course, E91 [24]. It was thus
thought that achieving security is equivalent to distilling pure entanglement, and a number of results pointed in this direction
[18], [19], [29], [48], [1], [28], [11].
Recently, however, we have shown that this is not the case – there exist examples of bound entangled states which can be
used to obtain a secret key [34]. Bound entangled states [36] are ones which need pure entanglement to create, but no pure
entanglement can be distilled from them. This helps explain the properties of bound entangled states. They have entanglement
which protects correlations from the environment (or an eavesdropper), but the entanglement is so twisted that it can’t be
brought into pure form. This then raised the question of what types of quantum states provide privacy. In [34] we were able to
find the general form of private quantum states γABA′B′ . This allowed us to recast the theory of privacy (under local operations
and public communication – or LOPC) in terms of entanglement theory (local operations and classical communication – or
LOCC). In entanglement theory, the basic unit is the EPR pair, while in privacy theory, the only difference is that one replaces
the EPR pair with general private states γABA′B′ as the basic units.
In the present article, we review the results of [34] in greater detail, and expand on the proofs and tools. Namely, we study
and show that the general form of a private state on a Hilbert space HA ⊗HA′ ⊗HB ⊗HB′ with dimensions dA = dB ≡ d,
dA′ and dB′ , is of the form
3γABA′B′ = UP
+
AB ⊗ σA′B′U †, (2)
where P+AB is a projector onto the maximally entangled state ψ+ =
∑
i
1√
d
|eifi〉, and U is the arbitrary twisting operation
U =
d−1∑
k,l=0
|ekfl〉〈ekfl|AB ⊗ UklA′B′ . (3)
The key is obtained after measuring in the |eifi〉 basis. We will henceforth refer to ψ+ as the maximally entangled or EPR
state (or Bell state in dimension 2 × 2). We show that the rate of key KD which can be obtained from a quantum state can
be strictly greater than the distillable entanglement, and this even holds if the distillable entanglement is strictly zero. We also
show [34] that the size of the private key is generally bounded from above by the regularized relative entropy of entanglement
E∞r [54]. This will be sufficient to prove that one can have a maximal rate of key strictly less than the entanglement cost (the
number of singlets required to prepare a state under LOCC).
In section II we introduce some of the basic concepts and terminology we will use throughout the paper. This includes the
notion of private states, pbits which contain one bit of private key, and pdits which have many bits of key. In Section III
we show that a state is secure if and only if it is of the form given above. Then we show different useful ways to write the
private states in Section IV, and give some useful examples, and examine some of their properties. This includes the notion
of irreducibility which is used to define the basic unit of privacy for private states.
States which have a perfect bit of key must have some distillable entanglement [39]. The case of bound entangled states
with secure key is only found in the case of states which are not perfectly secure, although they are arbitrarily secure. This
motives our investigation in Section V of approximate pbits. We then demonstrate how to rewrite a bipartite state in terms
of the eavesdropper’s density matrix in Section VI. This allows us to interpret previous results in terms of the eavesdropper’s
states. Then, in Section VII, we summarize the previous results in preparation for showing that bound entangled states can
have a key. In Sections VIII and IX, we review the paradigms of entanglement (LOCC) and privacy theory (LOPC), and show
the equivalence of key rates in the two paradigms. We then discuss and compare security criteria in these paradigms in Section
XV-C of the Appendix. In Section X we give a number of bound entangled states and show that they can produce a private
key. The methods allow one to find a wide class of states which are bound entangled, because the fact that they have key
automatically ensures that they are entangled, which is usually the difficult part in showing that a state is bound entangled (the
PPT criteria can be quickly checked to see that the states are non-distillable). In Section XI we prove that the relative entropy
distance is an upper bound on the rate of key.
In Section XII, a class of NPT states are introduced which appear to be bound entangled. They are derived from a class
of bound entangled private key states. An additional result discussed in Section XIII, which we only mentioned in passing in
[34], is that the bound entangled key states can be used as the basis of a cryptographic primitive we call a controlled private
quantum channel. We conclude in Section XIV with a few open questions.
II. SECURITY CONTAINED IN QUANTUM STATES
In this section we will introduce the class of states which contain at least one bit (or dit) of perfectly secure key which is
directly accessible – these we call private bits (or dits). We discuss the properties of these states and argue the generality of
this approach. In particular we introduce the notion of twisting, which is a basic concept in dealing with private states.
A well known state that contains one bit of secure key which is directly accessible is the singlet state. After measuring it in
a local basis Alice and Bob obtain bits that are perfectly correlated with each other and completely uncorrelated with the rest
of the world including an eavesdropper Eve. This is because the singlet state as a whole is decoupled from the environment,
being a pure state. However even if a state is mixed, it can contain secure key. Yet the key must then be located only in a
part of it. More formally, we consider a four-partite mixed state ρABA′B′ of two systems A,A′ belonging to Alice and B,B′
belonging to Bob. The AB subsystem of the state will be called the key part of the state – it is the part of the state which
produces key upon measurement. The A′B′ subsystem will be called the shield of the state. It is called this, because its
presence is what will cause the AB part of the state to be secure, by shielding information from an eavesdropper.
We assume the worst case scenario – that the state is the reduced density matrix of the pure state ψABA′B′E where we trace
out the system E belonging to eavesdropper Eve. We then distinguish a product basis B = {ei, fj} in system AB. For our
purposes, without loss of generality, we often choose B to be the standard basis {|ij〉}. Distinguishing the basis is connected
with the fact that we are dealing with classical security, which finally is realized in some fixed basis. Now, consider the state
of systems ABE after measurement performed in the basis B by Alice and Bob. This state is of the form
ρccq =
d−1∑
i,j=0
pij |eifj〉AB〈eifj | ⊗ ρEij . (4)
4The above form of the state is usually called a ccq state. We will therefore refer to a ccq state associated with state ρABA′B′ ,
and it is understood that it is also related to chosen basis B. The distribution pij will sometimes be referred to as the distribution
of the ccq state.
We can now distinguish types of states ρABA′B′ via looking at their ccq states (always assuming that some fixed basis B
was chosen):
Definition 1: A state ρABA′B′ is called secure with respect to a basis B ≡ {|eifj〉AB}di,j=1 if the state obtained via
measurement on AB subsystem of its purification in basis B followed by tracing out A′B′ subsystem (i.e. its ccq state) is
product with Eve’s subsystem: ( d−1∑
i,j=0
pij |eifj〉〈eifj |AB
)⊗ ρE . (5)
Such a state ρABA′B′ will be also called ”B secure”. Moreover if the distribution {pij} = { 1dδij} so that the ccq state is of
the form (d−1∑
i=0
1
d
|eifi〉〈eifi|AB
)⊗ ρE , (6)
the state ρABA′B′ is said to have B-key.
One can ask when two states ρABA′B′ and σABA′B′ are equally secure with respect to a given product basis B. First let us
define what does it mean ”equally secure”. A natural definition would be that when Alice and Bob measure systems AB in
the basis, then Eve by any means cannot distinguish between two situations, as far as the outcomes of the measurement are
concerned. In particular, the states are definitely equally secure, when their ccq states are equal.
For our purpose we will need to know when for two states the latter relation holds. It is obvious that any unitary transformation
applied to systems A′B′ of the state ρABA′B′ will not change the ccq state. (Note that it cannot be just any CP map; for
example, partial trace of systems A′B′ would mean giving it to Eve, which of course would change the ccq states). As it will
be demonstrated in the next section, we can actually do much more without changing the ccq state. Namely we can apply an
operation called ”twisting”. This operation is defined for system ABA′B′ and with respect to a product basis B of AB system
as follows:
Definition 2: Given product basis B = {ei, fj}k,l on systems AB, the unitary operation acting on system ABA′B′ of the
form
U =
d−1∑
k,l=0
|ekfl〉〈ekfl|AB ⊗ UklA′B′ , (7)
is called B-twisting, or shortly twisting.
Finally we define the class of private states. The states from that class are proven [34] to be the only quantum states which
after measurement on Alice and Bob subsystems give an ideal key. In other words these are the only states from which Alice
and Bob can get an ideal ccq state (6) according to definition 1 of security. For the sake of clarity, we recall this proof with
details in Section III.
Definition 3: A state ρABA′B′ of a Hilbert space HA ⊗HA′ ⊗HB ⊗HB′ with dimensions dA = dB ≡ d, dA′ and dB′ , of
the form
γ(d) =
1
d
d−1∑
i,j=0
|eifi〉〈ejfj|AB ⊗ UiσA′B′U †j , (8)
where the state σA′B′ is an arbitrary state of subsystem A′B′, Ui’s are arbitrary unitary transformations and {|ei〉}d−1i=0 , {|fj〉}d−1i=0
are local basis on HA and HB respectively, is called private state or pdit. In case of d = 2 the state is called pbit.
Note, that maximally entangled states are also private states, which is in case when d′A = d′B = 1. In general, any pdit can
be created out of a maximally entangled state with additional state on σA′B′ (which we will call basic pdit) by some twisting.
Definition 4: A state ρABA′B′ of a Hilbert space HA ⊗HA′ ⊗HB ⊗HB′ with dimensions dA = dB ≡ d, dA′ and dB′ , of
the form
ρABA′B′ = P
+
AB ⊗ σA′B′ , (9)
is called a basic pdit.
Remark 1: Let us note, that one could define states with ideal key also in a different way than in definition 1. Namely, we
could say that the state ρAB has B key iff it has a subsystem ab such, that the subsystem abE of its purification |ψABE〉 is
an ideal ccq state of eq. (6), where B = {|eifi〉}di=1. However maximally entangled state is not of this form, but is locally
equivlent to a state of this form, i.e. they would be transformable into one another by means of unitary embeddings or partial
isometries. In fact the whole class of so defined states with ideally secure key, would be locally equivalent to the one we have
introduced in definition 3, and by characterization of the latter, equivalent to the class of private states. Another definition of
5states with ideal key could be as follows. A state ρAB is called to have key if there are operations ΛA and ΛB with Kraus
operators {|i〉KA⊗X(i)A } and {|i〉KB⊗Y (i)B } respectively, such that the ccq state of subsystems KAKBE of the purification of
an output state ΛA⊗ΛB(ρAB), is an ideal ccq state of eq. (6). This definition however would not allow for easy characterization
of this class of states, and still, such states would be locally equivalent to private states defined in 3.
A. Some facts and notations
In what follows, by ||.|| we mean the trace norm, i.e. the sum of the singular values of an operator. For any bipartite operator
X ∈ B(H1 ⊗H2), by XΓ we mean the partial transposition of X with respect to system 2, that is:
(I1 ⊗ T2)X, (10)
where T2 denotes the matrix transposition over system 2 of a matrix X . For brevity, we will use the same symbol for
any partial transposition. In particular, we deal often with systems of four subsystems ABA′B′, and we will take partial
transposition with respect to subsystems B and B′. Hence ρΓABA′B′ denotes (IA ⊗ TB ⊗ IA′ ⊗ TB′)(ρABA′B′), with TB and
TB′ denoting the matrix transposition on systems B and B′ respectively. To give example of a mixed notation, we consider
ρABA′B′ ∈ B(C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ Cd ⊗ Cd). In block matrix form, such a state has a bipartite structure of blocks, so that it reads:
ρABA′B′ =


A0000 A0001 A0010 A0011
A0100 A0101 A0110 A0111
A1000 A1001 A1010 A1011
A1100 A1101 A1110 A1111

 . (11)
This state after partial transposition with respect to system BB′ reads:
ρΓABA′B′ =


AΓ0000 A
Γ
0100 A
Γ
0010 A
Γ
0110
AΓ0001 A
Γ
0101 A
Γ
0011 A
Γ
0111
AΓ1000 A
Γ
1100 A
Γ
1010 A
Γ
1110
AΓ1001 A
Γ
1101 A
Γ
1011 A
Γ
1111

 . (12)
In the above equation, the partial transposition on LHS is with respect to system BB′ and on the RHS, only with respect to
system B′, as the partial transposition with respect to system B, which is a one qubit system, resulted already in appropriate
reordering of the block operators Aijkl .
In what follows, we will repeatedly use equivalence of the trace norm distance and fidelity proved by Fuchs and van de
Graaf [26]:
Lemma 1: For any states ρ, ρ′ there holds
1− F (ρ, ρ′) ≤ 1
2
||ρ− ρ′|| ≤
√
1− F (ρ, ρ′)2 (13)
Here F (ρ, ρ′) = Tr
√√
ρρ′
√
ρ is fidelity;
We also use the Fannes inequality [25] (in the form of [2]):
|S(ρ)− S(σ)| ≤ 2||ρ− σ|| log d+ h(||ρ− σ||), (14)
which holds for arbitrary states ρ and σ satisfying ||ρ− σ|| ≤ 1.
B. On twisting and privacy squeezing
Here we will show that twisting does not change the ccq state arising from measurement of the key part. Then we will
introduce a useful tool by showing that twisting can pump entanglement responsible for security of ccq state into the key part.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 1: For any state ρAA′BB′ and any B-twisting operation U , the states ρAA′BB′ and σABA′B′ = UρAA′BB′U † have
the same ccq states w.r.t B, i.e. after measurement in basis B, the corresponding ccq states are equal: ρ˜ABE = σ˜ABE
Proof: To show that subsystem ρABE is not affected by B controlled unitary with a target on A′B′ we will consider the
whole pure state:
|ψABA′B′E〉 =
∑
ijklm
aijklm|ijklm〉 ≡ |ψ〉 (15)
(without loss of generality we take B to be standard basis). After von Neumann measurement on B and tracing out the A′B′
part the output state is the following:
ρ˜ABE =
∑
ijklmn
aijklma¯ijkln |ij〉〈ij| ⊗ |m〉〈n|. (16)
6Let us now subject |ψ〉 to controlled unitary UABA′B′ ⊗ IE ,
UABA′B′ ⊗ IE |ψ〉 =
∑
ijklm
aijklm|ij〉U ij |kl〉|m〉 ≡ |ψ˜〉, (17)
and then on the output state |ψ˜〉 perform a complete measurement on B reading the output:
Pij |ψ˜〉〈ψ˜|Pij =
∑
klmstn
aijklm a¯ijstn
|ij〉〈ij|AB ⊗ U ij |kl〉〈st|(U ij)†A′B′ ⊗ |m〉〈n|E . (18)
Performing partial trace and summing over i, j we obtain the same density matrix as in (16) which ends the proof.
The above theorem states that two states which differ by some twisting U , have the same ccq state obtained by measuring
their key parts, and tracing out their shields. However, since twisting does not affect only the ccq state, one can be interested in
how the whole state changes when subjected to such an operation. We will show now an example of twisting which will be of
great importance for further considerations in this paper. Subsequently, we will construct from this twisting an operation called
privacy squeezing (shortly: p-squeezing), which shows the importance of the above theorem. The operation of p-squeezing is
a kind of primitive in the paradigm which we will present in the paper.
Consider the following technical lemma:
Lemma 2: For any state σABA′B′ ∈ B(C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ Cd ⊗ Cd′) expressed in the form σABA′B′ =
∑1
ijkl=0 |ij〉〈kl| ⊗ Aijkl
there exists twisting Ups such that if we apply this to σABA′B′ , and trace out A′B′ part, the resulting state on AB ρAB =
TrA′B′ [UpsσABA′B′U
†
ps] will have the form
ρAB =


× × × ||A0011||
× × × ×
× × × ×
× × × ×

 , (19)
where we omit non-important elements of ρAB .
Proof: Twisting, by its definition (7) is determined by the set of unitary transformations. In the case of pbit which we now
consider, there are four unitary transformations which determine it: {Ukl}1k,l=0. Let us consider singular value decomposition
of the operator A0011 to be V RV˜ with V, V˜ unitary transformations, and R - nonnegative diagonal operator. Note, that by
unitary invariance of norm, we have that ||A0011|| = ||R|| = TrR. We then define twisting by choosing U00 = V †, U11 = V˜ ,
and U01 = U10 = I . The AB subsystem of twisted σABA′B′ state is
ρAB =
1∑
ijkl=0
Tr(UijAijklU
†
kl)|ij〉〈kl|, (20)
so for such chosen twisting we have indeed, that the element |00〉〈11| of the matrix of ρAB is equal to TrU †00V RV˜ U †11 =
TrR = ||A0011||, which proves the assertion.
We will give now the following corollary, which will serve as simple exemplification of this result.
Corrolary 1: Let the key part be two qubit system. Consider then a state of the form (where blocks are operator acting on
A′B′ system):
σABA′B′ =


A0000 0 0 A0011
0 A0101 A0110 0
0 A1001 A1010 0
A1100 0 0 A1111

 , (21)
there exists twisting such that the state after partial trace on A′B′ has a form
ρAB =


||A0000|| 0 0 ||A0011||
0 ||A0101|| ||A0110|| 0
0 ||A1001|| ||A1010|| 0
||A1100|| 0 0 ||A1111||

 . (22)
Proof: The construction of the twisting is similar as in lemma above. This time one has to consider also the singular
value decomposition of the operator A0110 = WSW ′.
We can see now, that with any state ρABA′B′ , which has two qubit key part AB, we can associate a state obtained in the
following way:
1) For state ρABA′B′ find twisting Ups, such, that (according to lemma 2) it changes upper-right element of AB subsystem
of ρABA′B′ into ||A0011||.
2) Apply Ups to ρABA′B′ obtaining ρ′ABA′B′ = UpsρABA′B′U †ps.
73) Trace out the shield (A′B′ subsystem) of state ρ′ABA′B′ obtaining two-qubit state
ρ′AB = TrA′B′ρ
′
ABA′B′ . (23)
This operation we will call privacy squeezing , or shortly p-squeezing , and the state ρ′AB which is the output of such
operation on the state ρABA′B′ ∈ B(C2⊗C2⊗Cd⊗Cd′) the p-squeezed state of the state ρABA′B′ . Sometimes we shall use
the term privacy squeezing in more informal sense, namely, with the twisting Ups which makes the key part close to maximally
entangled state.
Note, that the ccq state of p-squeezed state has no more secret correlations than that of the original state. This is because it
emerges from the operation of twisting which preserves security in some sense, i.e. it does not change the ccq state which can
be obtained from the original state. The next operation performed in definition of p-squeezed state is tracing out A′B′ part
which means giving the A′B′ subsystem to Eve. Such operation can not increase security of the state in any possible sense.
We will be interested in applying p-squeezing in the case, where the key part of the initial state was weakly entangled, or
completely separable. Then the p-squeezing operation will make it entangled.
We can say, that the operation of privacy squeezing pumps the entanglement of the state which is distributed along subsystems
AA′BB′ into its key part AB. The entanglement once concentrated in the two qubit part, may be much more powerful than
the one spread over the whole system. Further in the paper, we will see that from the bound entangled state, the operation of
p-squeezing can produce approximately a maximally entangled state of two qubits. Then the analysis of how much key one
can draw from the ccq state is much easier in the case of the p-squeezing state.
III. GENERAL FORM OF STATES CONTAINING IDEAL KEY.
In this section we will provide general form of the states ρABA′B′ which have B key, i.e. states such that the outcomes of
measurement in basis B are both perfectly correlated and perfectly secure. It turns out that this is precisely the class of private
states. Hence the definitions 1 and 3 are equivalent. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 2: Any state ρABA′B′ of a Hilbert space HA ⊗HA′ ⊗HB ⊗HB′ with dimensions dA = dB ≡ d, dA′ and dB′ ,
has B-key if and only if it is of the form
ρABA′B′ =
1
d
d−1∑
i,j=0
|eifi〉〈ejfj |AB ⊗ UiσA′B′U †j (24)
where the state σA′B′ is an arbitrary state of subsystem A′B′, Ui’s are arbitrary unitary transformations and {ei ⊗ fj} = B.
We can rewrite the state (24) in the following, more appealing form
ρABA′B′ = UP
+
AB ⊗ σA′B′U †, (25)
where P+AB is a projector onto the maximally entangled state ψ+ =
∑
i
1√
d
|eifi〉, and U is arbitrary twisting operation (7).
Since the state P+AB has many matrix elements vanishing, not all unitaries from definition of twisting are actually used here.
In fact, unitaries Ui in equation (24) are to be identified with unitaries Ukk from equation (7). Note, that we can take σA′B′ to
be ”classically correlated” in the sense that it is diagonal in some product basis. Indeed, twisting can change the state σA′B′
into any other state having the same eigenvalues (simply, twisting can incorporate a unitary transformation acting solely on
A′B′).
Thus we see that the states which have key, are closely connected with the maximally entangled state, which has been
so far a ”symbol” of quantum security. As we shall see, the maximally entangled state may get twisted so much, that after
measurement in many bases of the AB part the outcomes will be correlated with Eve, which is not the case for the maximally
entangled state itself. Still, however the basis B will remain secure. Note that here we deal with perfect security. We will later
discuss approximate security in Section V.
Proof: (⇐)
This part of the proof is a consequence of the theorem 1. Namely a basic pdit (9) is obviously B-secure, because it has
maximal correlations in this basis, and moreover it is a pure state, hence the one completely decoupled from Eve. More
formally, it is evident that the ccq state of basic pdit is of the form (6). Now we can apply theorem 1, which says that after
twisting the ccq state is unchanged. Hence any state of the form (24) has also B key.
Proof: (⇒)
In this part we assume, that the state ρABA′B′ has B-key i.e. that after measurement on it’s AB part, one gets a perfectly
correlated state (between Alice and Bob) that is uncorrelated with Eve:
(d−1∑
i=0
1
d
|eifi〉〈eifi|AB
)⊗ ρE . (26)
8Let us consider general pure state for which dimensions of A,B are d, dimensions of A′, B′ are dA′ , dB′ respectively, and
dimension of subsystem E is the smallest one which allows for the whole state being a pure one.
|ψ〉 = |ψABA′B′E〉 =
∑
ijklm
aijklm|eifjklm〉. (27)
one can rewrite it as
|ψ〉 =
∑
ij
|eifj〉AB |ψ˜(ij)〉A′B′E . (28)
with |ψ˜(ij)〉A′B′E =
∑
klm aijklm|klm〉.
It is easy to see that the scalar product 〈ψ˜(ij)|ψ˜(ij)〉 equals the probability of obtaining the state |eifj〉〈eifj |AB on the
system AB after measurement in basis B. Now, since the subsystem ρABE (after measurement in B on AB) must be maximally
correlated, the vectors |ψ˜(ij)〉 should satisfy 〈ψ˜(ij)|ψ˜(ij)〉 = 1
d
δij . We can normalize these states (in case i = j) to have:
|ψ(ii)〉 := |ψ˜
(ii)〉√
〈ψ˜(ii)|ψ˜(ii)〉
=
√
d|ψ˜(ii)〉 (29)
so that the total state has a form:
|ψ〉 =
d−1∑
i=0
1√
d
|eifi〉AB |ψ(ii)〉A′B′E . (30)
”Cryptographical” interpretation of this state is the following: if Alice and Bob gets i−th result, then Eve gets subsystem ρEi
of a state |ψ(ii)〉A′B′E . Indeed, the ccq state is then of the form
ρccq =
d−1∑
i=0
1
d
|eifi〉AB〈eifi| ⊗ ρEi , (31)
with ρi = TrA′B′(|ψ(ii)〉A′B′E〈ψ(ii)|). Now the condition (26) implies that, ρEi should be all equal to each other. In particular,
it follows that rank of Eve’s total density matrix is no greater than dimension of A′B′ system, hence we can assume that
dE = dA′dB′ = d
′
. It is convenient to rewrite this pure state in a form
|ψ(ii)〉A′B′E =
d′−1∑
k=0
|k〉A′B′Xi|k〉E , (32)
where {|k〉} is standard basis of A′B′ and of E system, Xi is dE × dE matrix that fully represents this state. It is easy to
check, that ρEi = XiX
†
i . Consider now singular value decomposition of Xi given by Vi
√
ρiU
†
i where ρi is now diagonal in
basis {|k〉}. One then gets that ρEi = ViρiV †i . The state (32) may be rewritten
|ψ(ii)〉A′B′E =
∑
k
XTi |k〉A′B′ |k〉E , (33)
where T is transposition in basis {|k〉}. Now it is easy to check, that subsystem A′B′ of |ψ(ii)〉A′B′E is in state XTi (XTi )†,
so that the whole state ρABA′B′ is the following:
ρABA′B′ =
1
d
d−1∑
i,j=0
|eifi〉〈ejfj |AB ⊗XTi (X†j )T . (34)
We can express this state using states accessible to Eve, namely ρEj :
ρABA′B′ =
1
d
d−1∑
i,j=0
|eifi〉〈ejfj|AB ⊗
(U∗i V
T
i )V
∗
i
√
ρi
T
V Ti︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
√
ρE
i
T
V ∗j
√
ρj
TV Tj︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
√
ρE
j
T
(V ∗j U
T
j ). (35)
(For expressing state in terms of Eve’s states in more general case, see Section VI). Denoting by Wi the unitary transformation
U∗i V
T
i one gets:
ρABA′B′ =
1
d
d−1∑
i,j=0
|eifi〉〈ejfj |AB ⊗Wi
√
ρEi
T
.
√
ρEj
T
W †j . (36)
9However, as mentioned above, Eve’s density matrices are equal to each other, i.e. ρEi = ρEj for all i, j. We then obtain
ρABA′B′ =
1
d
d−1∑
i,j=0
|eifi〉〈ejfj|AB ⊗WiρW †j A′B′ . (37)
This completes the proof of theorem 2.
IV. PDITS AND THEIR PROPERTIES
In this section we will present various forms of pdits and pbits. We will first write the pbit in matrix form according to its
original definition. We can write it in block form
γ
(2)
ABA′B′ =
1
2


U0σA′B′U
†
0 0 0 U0σA′B′U
†
1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
U1σA′B′U
†
0 0 0 U1σA′B′U
†
1

 , (38)
where σA′B′ is arbitrary state on A′B′ subsystem, and U0 and U1 are arbitrary unitary transformations which act on A′B′.
”Generalized EPR form” of pdit. Since by the theorem of the previous section pdits are the only states that contain B-key,
they could be called generalized EPR states (maximally entangled state). We have already seen that they are ”twisted EPR
states”. One can notice an even closer connection. Namely, a pdit can be viewed as an EPR states with operator amplitudes.
Indeed, one can rewrite equation (34) in a more appealing form
γ
(d)
ABA′B′ = ΨΨ
†, (39)
with
Ψ =
1√
d
d−1∑
i=0
Y A
′B′
i ⊗ |eifi〉AB . (40)
We have written here (unlike in the rest the of paper) first the A′B′ system and then the AB one, so that this form of pdit
would recall a form of pure state. Thus instead of c-numbers the amplitudes are now q-numbers, so that states which have key
are ”second quantized EPR states”. In the case of pbits, the matrix form is the following:
γ
(2)
ABA′B′ =
1
2


Y0Y
†
0 0 0 Y0Y
†
1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Y1Y
†
0 0 0 Y1Y
†
1

 . (41)
Let us consider the polar decomposition of operators Yi. From definition of pdit it follows that the only constraint on these
operators is the following
∀i Yi = Ui√ρ, (42)
where Ui is unitary transformation and ρ is a normalized state as so is the σA′B′ state in form (38).
This reflects the fact, that similarly like maximally entangled state which produces correlated outputs has amplitudes with
probably different phases, but the same moduli, the ”maximally private” state can have ”operator amplitudes” which differ by
Ui ( a counterpart of the phase) but have the same √ρ in polar decomposition (which is a counterpart of the modulus).
There is yet another similarity to EPR states, namely the norm of upper-right block Y0Y †1 is equal to 12 , like the modulus
of the coherence of the EPR state.
”X-form” of pbit. In special case of pbits one can have representation by just one normalized operator:
γ
(2)
ABA′B′ =
1
2


√
XX† 0 0 X
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
X† 0 0
√
X†X

 , (43)
for any operator X satisfying ||X || = 1.
Justification of equivalence of this form and standard form is the following. Consider singular value decomposition of X
X = UσW with U and W unitary transformations and σ being diagonal, positive matrix. Since X has trace norm 1, the same
is for σ, therefore it can be viewed as X = UρW with ρ being a legitimate state. Identifying U0 = U and U1 = W † we
obtain standard form.
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It is important, that in nontrivial cases X should be a non-positive operator. Otherwise the pbit is equal to basic pbit. Indeed,
if it is positive, then since its trace norm is 1, it is itself a legitimate state, call it ρ. Then
√
XX† =
√
X†X = ρ, so that
ρABA′B′ =
1
2
1∑
i,j=0
|ii〉〈jj| ⊗ ρ = |ψ+〉〈ψ+| ⊗ ρ.
which is the basic pbit (9).
Note, that in higher dimension to have the X-form we need more than one operator, and the operators depend on each other,
which is not as simple representation as in the case of pbit. For example in d = 3 case we have:
1
3


√
XX† 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 XY
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
X† 0 0 0
√
X†X 0 0 0 Y
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(XY )† 0 0 0 Y † 0 0 0
√
Y †Y


, (44)
where the operators X and Y satisfy: ||X || = 1 and X = WY † for arbitrary unitary transformation W .
”Flags form”: special case of X-form. If the operator X which represents pbit in its X-form is additionally hermitian, any
such pbit can be seen as a mixture of basic pbit and a variation of basic pbit which has EPR states with different phase:
γ
(2)
ABA′B′ = p|ψ+〉〈ψ+| ⊗ ρ+A′B′ + (1− p)|ψ−〉〈ψ−| ⊗ ρ−A′B′ , (45)
where |ψ±〉 = 1√2 (|00〉 ± |11〉). Derivation of this form is straightforward, if we consider decomposition of X into positive
and negative part [9]:
X = X+ −X−, (46)
where X+ and X− are by definition orthogonal, and positive. Thus denoting p = TrX+, together with assumption of X-form
that ||X || = Tr|X | = 1, we can rewrite X as
X = pρ+ − (1− p)ρ−, (47)
where ρ± are normalized positive and negative parts of X . Moreover, since the states ρ+ and ρ− are orthogonal: Trρ−ρ+ = 0,
we obtain the form (45).
A. Private bits - examples
We will give now two examples of private bits, and study its entanglement distillation properties.
Examples of pbit
1) Let us consider state γV ∈ B(C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ Cd ⊗ Cd) of the following form:
γV =
1
2


I
d2
0 0 V
d2
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
V
d2
0 0 I
d2

 , (48)
where V is the swap operator which reads: V =
∑d−1
i=0 |ij〉〈ji|. If we consider positive and negative part of V , which
are symmetric and antisymmetric subspace, it is easy to see, that
γV = p|ψ+〉〈ψ+| ⊗ ρs + (1− p)|ψ−〉〈ψ−| ⊗ ρa (49)
where
ρs =
2
d2 + d
Psym ρa =
2
d2 − dPasym (50)
are symmetric and antisymmetric Werner states, and p = 12 (1 +
1
d
). Thus we have obtained, that it is also a pbit with
natural ”flags form”, with flags being (orthogonal) Werner states [58].
2) The second example is the state known as ”flower state”, which was shown [31] to lock entanglement cost. We have
that ρflower ∈ B(C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ Cd2 ⊗ Cd2) is of the form:
γflower =
1
2


σ 0 0 1
d
UT
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1
d
U∗ 0 0 σ

 , (51)
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where σ is classical maximally correlated state: σ =
∑d−1
i=0
1
d
|ii〉〈ii|, and U is the embedding of unitary transformation
W =
∑d−1
i,j=0 wij |i〉〈j| = H⊗log d with H being Hadamard transform in the following way:
U =
d−1∑
i,j=0
wij |ii〉〈jj|.
We can check now, that this state is pbit with X-form. In this case X = UT . To see this consider unitary transformation
S := U∗ +
∑
i6=j |ij〉〈ij|. Composing S with UT does not change the norm, which is unitarily invariant, so that
||1
d
UT || = ||1
d
UTS|| = ||1
d
d−1∑
i=0
|ii〉〈ii||| = 1. (52)
Thus we see, that ||X || = 1. We have also
√
XX† = σ:√
1
d2
UTU∗ = [
1
d2
d−1∑
i=0
|ii〉〈ii|] 12 = σ. (53)
We will show now, that in case of γV given in eq. (48), the distillable entanglement ED is strictly smaller then the amount
of secure key KD gained from these states. The formal definition of KD is given in Section VIII. Here it is enough to base
only on its intuitive properties. Namely, any pdit by its very definition has KD at least equal to log d of key, which can be
obtained by measuring its key part. To show the gap between distillable entanglement and distillable key we will compute the
value of another measure of entanglement: log-negativity EN (ρ) (see [59]) of the state, which is an upper bound on distillable
entanglement [56]. To this end consider the following lemma.
Lemma 3: For any pbit in X-form, if
√
XX† and
√
X†X are PPT, the log negativity of the pbit in X-form reads EN =
log(1 + ||XΓ||), where Γ is transposition performed on the system B′.
The proof of this lemma is given in Sec. XV-E of Appendix. Using this lemma, one can check the negativity of the state
γV . We have in this case X = V
d2
, with d ≥ 2. Since V Γ = dP+, we obtain EN (γV ) = log(1 + 1d ). It implies:
ED(γ
V ) ≤ EN (γV ) = log(1 + 1
d
) < 1 ≤ KD(γV ), (54)
which demonstrates a desired gap between distillable key and distillable entanglement:
ED(γ
V ) < KD(γ
V ). (55)
B. Relative entropy of entanglement and pdits
In this section we will consider the entanglement contents of the pbit in terms of a measure of entanglement called relative
entropy of entanglement, defined as follows:
Er(ρ) = inf
σsep∈SEP
S(ρ|σsep) (56)
where S(ρ||σ) = −S(ρ)−Trρ logσ is the relative entropy, and SEP is the set of separable states. In the Section XI we will
show, that for any state, the relative entropy of entanglement is an upper bound on the key rate, that can be obtained from the
state (for generalizations of this result to a wide class of entanglement monotones see [13], [14]). It is then easy to see, that
for any pbit γ, Er(γ) is greater than log d since KD(γ) ≥ log d by definition of pdits. The question we address here, is the
upper bound on the relative entropy of the pdit. We relate its value to the states which appear on the shield of the pdits, when
Alice and Bob get key by measuring the key part of the pdit. The theorem below states it formally.
Theorem 3: For any pdit γABA′B′ ∈ B(Cd ⊗ Cd ⊗ Cd′A ⊗ Cd′B), which is secure in standard basis, let ρ(i)A′B′ denote states
which appears on shield of the pbit, after obtaining outcome ii in measurement performed in standard basis on its key part.
Then we have
Er(γABA′B′) ≤ log d+ 1
d
d−1∑
i=0
Er(ρ
(i)
A′B′) (57)
where AB denotes key and A′B′ shieldpart of the pdit.
Proof: One can view the quantity 1
d
∑d−1
i=0 Er(ρ
(i)
A′B′) as the relative entropy of γABA′B′ dephased on AB in computational
basis [31]. In case d = 2k, it can be easily done with applying unitary Ui - random sequence of σz and I unitary transformations.
In general case one can use the so called Weyl unitary operators (see e.g. [27]). Such an implementation of dephasing uses
log d bits of randomness.
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Following the proof of non-lockability of relative entropy of entanglement [31] (see also [42]), we can write
Er(γABA′B′)− Er(
∑
i
piσi) ≤ log d (58)
where σi = Ui ⊗ IA′B′γABA′B′U †i ⊗ IA′B′ and pi = 1d . As we have observed above, the relative entropy of dephased state∑
i piσi equals
1
d
∑d−1
i=0 Er(ρ
(i)
A′B′) which ends the proof.
The above theorem is valid also for regularized relative entropy, defined as [21]
Er(ρ)
∞ = lim
n→∞
1
n
Er(ρ
⊗n). (59)
Theorem 4: Under the assumptions of theorem 3 there holds:
E∞r (γABA′B′) ≤ log d+
1
d
d−1∑
i=0
E∞r (ρ
i
A′B′), (60)
For the proof of this theorem, as rather technical, we refer the reader to Appendix XV-F.
C. Irreducible pbit - a unit of privacy
In Section III we have characterized states which contain ideal key i.e. pdits. A pdit has an AB subsystem called here the
key part. log d bits of key can be obtained from such a pdit by a complete measurement in some basis performed on this key
part of pdit . However, as it follows from the characterization given in theorem 2, pdits have also the A′B′ subsystem, called
here the shield. This part can also serve as a source of key. Indeed there are plenty of such pdits that contain more than log d
key, due to their shield. Therefore not every pdit can serve as a of unit of privacy and we need the following definition:
Definition 5: Any pdit γ (with d-dimensional key part) for which KD(γ) = log d is called irreducible.
This definition distinguishes those pdits for which measuring their key part is the optimal protocol for drawing key. They
are called irreducible in opposite to those, which can be reduced by distillation protocol to some other pdits which have more
than log d of key. Irreducible pdits are by definition units of privacy (although they are not generally interconvertible).
Determining the class of irreducible pdits is potentially a difficult task, as it leads to optimisation over protocols of key
distillation. However we are able to show a subclass of pdits, which are irreducible. To this end we use a result, which is
proven in Section XI, namely that the relative entropy of entanglement is an upper bound on distillable key. Having this we
can state the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Any pdit γ, with Er(γ) = log d, is irreducible.
Proof: By definition of pdit we have KD(γ) ≥ log d and by theorem 9 from Section XI we have KD(γ) ≤ Er(γ) which
is in turn less than log d by assumption, and the assertion follows. We can provide now a class of pdits which have Er = log d
and by the above proposition are irreducible. These are pdits which have separable states that appear on shield conditionally
on outcomes of complete measurement on key part part in the computational basis.
Proposition 2: For any pdit γABA′B′ ∈ B(Cd ⊗ Cd ⊗ Cd′A ⊗ Cd′B), which is secure in standard basis, if ρ(i)A′B′ denote states
which appear on shield of the pbit, after obtaining outcome |i〉|i〉 in measurement performed in standard basis on its key part
are separable states, then pdit γABA′B′ is irreducible.
Proof: Due to bound on relative entropy of pdit given in theorem 3 we have that Er(γ) is less then or equal to log d
since conditional states ρ(i)A′B′ are separable and hence have relative entropy of entanglement equal to zero. Er(γ) is also not
less then log d, since it is greater than the amount of distillable key, which ends the proof.
Note, that examples (48), (51) given in Section IV-A fulfill the assumptions of this theorem, and are therefore irreducible
pbits. They are also the first known non trivial states (different than pure state) for which the amount of distillable key has been
calculated. Using the bound of relative entropy on distillable key, one can also show, that the class of maximally correlated
states has KD = ED = Er, since for the latter ED = Er.
V. APPROXIMATE PBITS
We present here a special property of states which are close to pbit. We have already seen, that pbits have similar properties
to the maximally entangled EPR states. In particular, the norm of the upper-right block in standard form as well as in X-form
of pbit is equal to 12 . We will show here, that for general states the norm of that block tells how close the state is to a pbit:
any state which is close in trace norm to pbit must have the norm of this block close to 12 , and vice versa.
We will need the following lemma that relates the value of coherence to the distance from the maximally entangled state
for two qubit states.
Lemma 4: For any bipartite state ρAB ∈ B(C2 ⊗ C2) expressed on the form ρAB =
∑1
ijkl=0 aijkl |ij〉〈kl| we have:
TrρABP+ ≥ 1− ǫ⇒ Re(a0011) > 1
2
− ǫ (61)
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and
Re(a0011) >
1
2
− ǫ⇒ TrρABP+ ≥ 1− 2ǫ (62)
Proof: For the proof of this lemma, see Appendix XV-G.
We can prove now that approximate pbits have norm of an appropriate block close to 12 .
Proposition 3: If the state σABA′B′ ∈ B(C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ Cd ⊗ Cd′) written in the form σABA′B′ =
∑1
ijkl=0 |ij〉〈kl| ⊗ Aijkl
fulfills
||σABA′B′ − γABA′B′ || ≤ ǫ (63)
for some pbit γ, then for 0 < ǫ < 1 there holds ||A0011|| ≥ 12 − ǫ.
Proof: The pbit γ is a twisted EPR state, which means that there exists twisting U which applied to basic pbit P+⊗ρ gives
γ. We apply this U to both states σABA′B′ and γ and trace out the A′B′ subsystem of both of them. Since these operations
can not increase the norm distance between these states, so that we have for σAB = TrA′B′UσABA′B′U †
||σAB − P+|| ≤ ǫ. (64)
It implies, by equivalence of norm and fidelity (1) that
F (σAB , P+) ≥ 1− 1
2
ǫ. (65)
We have also that F (σAB , P+)2 = TrσABP+ so that
TrσABP+ > 1− ǫ (66)
for ǫ < 1. Now by lemma (4) this yields |a0011| ≥ Re(a0011) ≥ 12 − ǫ, where a0011 is coherence of the state ρAB =∑1
ijkl=0 aijkl|ij〉〈kl|. However, we have
|a0011| = |TrU00A0011U †11| (67)
where U00 and U11 come from twisting, that we have applied. Using now the fact that ‖A‖ = supU TrAU , where supremum
is taken over unitary transformations we get
‖A0011‖ ≥ |a0011| ≥ 1− ǫ. (68)
This ends the proof.
Now we will formulate and prove the converse statement, saying that when the norm of the right upper block is close to
1/2, then the state is close to some pbit.
Proposition 4: If the state σABA′B′ ∈ B(C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ Cd ⊗ Cd′) with a form σABA′B′ =
∑1
ijkl=0 |ij〉〈kl| ⊗ Aijkl fulfills
||A0011|| > 12 − ǫ then for 0 < ǫ < 18 there exists pbit γ such, that
||σABA′B′ − γABA′B′ || ≤ δ(ǫ) (69)
with δ(ǫ) vanishing, when ǫ approaches zero. More specifically,
δ(ǫ) = 2
√
8
√
2ǫ+ h(2
√
2ǫ) + 2
√
2ǫ (70)
with h(.) being the binary entropy function h(x) = −x log x− (1 − x) log(1− x).
Proof: In this proof by ρX we denote respective reduced density matrix of the state ρABA′B′ . Let ρAB be the privacy-
squeezed state of the state σABA′B′ i.e. ρAB = TrA′B′ρABA′B′ where ρABA′B′ = UpsσABA′B′U †ps for certain twisting Ups.
By definition the entry a0011 of ρAB is equal to ||A0011||. By assumption we have, a0011 = ||A0011|| > 12 − ǫ. By lemma 4
(equation (62)) we have that
TrρABP+ > 1− 2ǫ. (71)
We have then
F (ρAB, P+)
2 = TrρABP+ (72)
which, by equivalence of norm and fidelity (13) gives
||ρAB − P+|| ≤ 2
√
2ǫ. (73)
Let us now consider the state ρABA′B′ = UpsσABA′B′U †ps and its purification to Eve’s subsystem ψABA′B′E so that we
have:
ρAB = TrA′B′E(ψABA′B′E) (74)
By the Fannes inequality (see eq. (14) in Sec. II-A) we have that
S(ρAB) = S(ρA′B′E) ≤ 4
√
2ǫ log dAB + h(2
√
2ǫ). (75)
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¿From this we will get that ||ψABA′B′E − ρAB ⊗ ρA′B′E || is of order of ǫ. We prove this as follows. Since norm distance is
bounded by relative entropy as follows [45]
1
2
||ρ1 − ρ2||2 ≤ S(ρ1|ρ2), (76)
one gets:
||ψABA′B′E − ρAB ⊗ ρA′B′E || ≤
√
2S(ψABA′B′E ||ρAB ⊗ ρA′B′E). (77)
The relative entropy distance of the state to it’s subsystems is equal to quantum mutual information
I(ψAB|A′B′E) = S(ρAB) + S(ρA′B′E)− S(ψABA′B′E), (78)
(We will henceforth use shorthand notation I(X : Y ), S(X)). which gives
I(AB : A′B′E) = 2S(AB) ≤ 2(4
√
2ǫ log dAB + h(2
√
2ǫ)). (79)
where last inequality comes from Eq. (75). Coming back to inequality (77) we have that
||ψABA′B′E − ρAB ⊗ ρA′B′E || ≤
√
2I(AB : A′B′E) ≤ 2
√
4
√
2ǫ log dAB + h(2
√
2ǫ) (80)
If we trace out the subsystem E the inequality is preserved:
||ρABA′B′ − ρAB ⊗ ρA′B′ || ≤ 2
√
8
√
ǫ+ h(2
√
ǫ), (81)
where we have put dAB = 4, as we deal with pbits. Now by triangle inequality one has:
||ρABA′B′ − P+ ⊗ ρA′B′ || ≤ ||ρABA′B′ − ρAB ⊗ ρA′B′ ||+ ||ρAB ⊗ ρA′B′ − P+ ⊗ ρA′B′ ||. (82)
We can apply now the bounds (73) and (81) to the above inequality obtaining
||ρABA′B′ − P+ ⊗ ρA′B′ || ≤ 2
√
8
√
2ǫ+ h(2
√
2ǫ) + 2
√
2ǫ. (83)
Let us now apply the twisting U †ps (transformation which is inverse to twisting Ups) to both states on left-hand-side of the
above inequality. Since ρABA′B′ is defined as UpsσABA′B′U †ps we get that:
||σABA′B′ − U †psP+ ⊗ ρA′B′Ups|| ≤ 2
√
8
√
2ǫ+ h(2
√
2ǫ) + 2
√
2ǫ, (84)
i.e. our state is close to pbit γ = U †psP+ ⊗ ρA′B′Ups. Then the theorem follows with δ(ǫ) = 2
√
8
√
2ǫ+ h(2
√
2ǫ) + 2
√
2ǫ.
Remark 2: The above propositions establish the norm of upper-right block of matrix (written in computational basis according
to ABA’B’ order of subsystems), as a parameter that measures closeness to pbit, and in this sense it measures security of the
bit obtained from the key part. The state of form (21) is close to a pbit if and only if the norm of this block is close to 12 .
This is the property of approximate pbits, however it seems not to have an analogue for approximate pdits with d ≥ 3.
VI. EXPRESSING ALICE AND BOB STATES IN TERMS OF EVE’S STATES
In this section we will express the state ρABA′B′ in such a way that one explicitly sees Eve’s states in it. We will then
interpret the results of the previous sections in terms of such a representation. In particular, we will see that the norm of the
upper-right block not only measures closeness to pbit, but it also measures the security of the bit from the key part directly,
in terms of fidelity between corresponding Eve’s states.
A. The case without shield. ”Abelian” twisting.
Consider first the easier case of a state without shield i.e.
ρAB =
∑
iji′j′
ρiji′j′ |ij〉〈i′j′|. (85)
Purification of this state is of the following form
ψABE =
∑
ij
√
pij |ij〉AB|ψijE 〉 (86)
where pij = ρijij . We see, that when Alice and Bob measure the state in basis |ij〉, Eve’s states corresponding to outcomes
ij are ψij , and they occur with probabilities pij . Performing partial trace over Eve’s system, one obtains
ρAB =
∑
iji′j′
√
pijpi′j′〈ψi
′j′
E |ψijE 〉|ij〉〈i′j′| (87)
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Thus the matrix elements of ρAB are inner products of Eve’s states. If we have all inner products between set of states, we
have complete knowledge about the set, up to a total unitary rotation, which is irrelevant for security issues (since Eve can
perform this herself). Thus density matrix ρAB can be represented in such a way that all properties of Eve’s states are explicitly
displayed. Moreover, moduli of matrix elements are related to fidelity between Eve’s states:
|ρiji′j′ | = √pijpi′j′ F (ψijE , ψi
′j′
E ). (88)
a) Two-qubit case.: For example, for two qubits, the density matrix looks as follows (we have not shown all elements)
ρAB =


p00 × × √p00p11〈ψ11E |ψ00E 〉
× p01 × ×
× × p10 ×
× × × p11

 (89)
Let us now consider the conditions for having one bit of perfect key obtained from the measurement in the two qubit case.
They are as follows: (i) p00 = p11 = 1/2 and (ii) ψ00 = ψ11 up to a phase factor. The latter condition is equivalent to
F (ψ00, ψ11) = 1 (we have dropped here the index E). The two conditions can be represented by a single condition:
√
p00p11 F (ψ00, ψ11) =
1
2
(90)
However, we know from (88) that this means that upper-right matrix element of ρAB should satisfy |ρ0011| = 1/2. Consider
now approximate bit of key, so that the conditions are satisfied up to some accuracy. Again we can combine them into single
condition √
p00p11F (ψ
E
00, ψ
E
11) >
1
2
− ǫ (91)
This translates into
|ρ0011| ≥ 1
2
− ǫ, (92)
which gives:
F 2 ≤ 1
2
(1 + 2|ρ0011|), (93)
where ψME = 1√2 (e
iφ00 |00〉+ eiφ11 |11〉), and F 2 = 〈ψME |ρ|ψME〉.
Thus, in particular for F = 1, we must have |ρ0011| = 1/2. The change of phases can be viewed as a unitary operation,
where phases are controlled by the basis |ij〉:
U =
∑
ij
|ij〉〈ij|eiφij (94)
Since we have ψmax = U |ψ+〉, this operation can be called ”abelian” twisting. Abelian because only phases are controlled.
Thus we can summarize our considerations by the following statement. A two-qubit state has perfectly secure one bit of key
with respect to basis |ij〉, if and only if it is a twisted EPR state (by abelian twisting of Eq. (94)):
ρAB = U |ψ+〉〈ψ+|U †. (95)
Moreover, if a state satisfies security condition approximately, it must be close in fidelity to some state Uψ+. The quality of
the bit of key is given by magnitude of a c-number |ρ0011|.
B. The general case.
In this section we will represent in terms of Eve’s states the state which has both key part and shield. We will see then,
how the twisting becomes ”nonabelian”, and the condition of closeness to pure state Uψ+ changes into that of closeness to
pbit. If we write state in basis of system AB (key part) we get blocks Aiji′j′ instead of matrix elements
ρABA′B′ =
∑
iji′j′
|ij〉AB〈i′j′| ⊗Aiji
′j′
A′B′ . (96)
After suitable transformations (see Appendix XV-A for details), we arrive at the following form:
ρABA′B′ =
∑
iji′j′
√
pijpi′j′ |ij〉AB〈i′j′| ⊗
(Uij√ρijE√ρi′j′E U†i′j′)T , (97)
where the operator U†ij ≡ UijWVij maps the space HA′B′ exactly onto a support of ρi
′j′
E in space HE , and the dual operator
Uij = V †ijW†U †ij maps the support of ρijE back to HA′B′ .
Let us note, that in parallel to Eq. (88) we have that the trace norms of the blocks A are connected with fidelities between
Eve’s states
‖Aiji′j′‖ = √pijpi′j′ F (ρijE , ρi
′j′
E ) (98)
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b) The case of two qubit key part: If the key part is two qubit system we get
ρABA′B′ =


p00[U00ρ00E U†00]T × ×
√
p00p11 [U00
√
ρ00E
√
ρ11E U†11]T
× p01[U01ρ01E U†01]T × ×
× × p10[U10ρ10E U†10]T ×
× × × p00[U11ρ11E U†11]T

 (99)
Let us now discuss conditions for presence of one bit of key. They are again (i) p00 + p11 = 12 and (ii) Eve’s states are the
same ρ00E = ρ
11
E . This is equivalent to √
p00p11 F (ρ
00
E , ρ
11
E ) =
1
2
(100)
which is nothing but trace norm of upper-right block ‖A0011‖. Also conditions for approximate bit of key requires the norm to
be close to 12 . Moreover, to see how pbit and the twisting arise, let us put all Eve’s states equal to each other, and probabilities
corresponding to perfect correlations. We then obtain
ρABA′B′ =
1
d
∑
ij
|ii〉AB〈jj| ⊗ [UiiρEU†jj ]T . (101)
where ρE is one fixed state, that Eve has irrespectively of outcomes. We see here almost the form of pbit. One difference
might be is that instead of usual unitaries, we have some embeddings Uii. However, since now Eve’s space is of the same
dimension as A′B′ (because Eve has single state), they are actually usual unitaries. The transposition does not really make a
difference, as it can be absorbed both by state, and by unitaries. It is interesting to see here in place of phases from previous
section the unitaries appeared, so that abelian twisting changed into nonabelian one. Also the condition for key changed from
modulus of c-number - matrix element, to a trace norm of q-number - a block.
VII. OVERVIEW
In this section we will shortly summarize what we have done so far. Then we will describe the goals of the paper, and
briefly outline how we will achieve them.
A. Pbits and twisting
We have considered a state shared by Alice and Bob, which was divided into two parts: the key part AB and the shield
A′B′. The key part is measured in a local basis, while the shield is kept. The latter is seen by Eve as an environment that
may restrict her knowledge about outcomes of measurement performed on the pdit.
We have shown two important facts. First, we have characterized all the states for which measurement on the key part
gives perfect key. The states are called pdits, and they have a very simple form. Moreover, we have shown that twisting does
not change the ccq state arising from measurement on the key part part. (We should emphasize here, that twisting must be
controlled by just the same basis in which the measurement is performed.)
This is an interesting feature, because twisting may be a nonlocal transformation. Thus even though we apply a nonlocal
transformation to the state, the quality of the key established by measuring the key part (in the same basis) does not change.
¿From the exhibited examples of pbits, we have seen that some of them have very small distillable entanglement. Since pbits
are EPR states subjected to twisting, we see that in this case the twisting must have been very nonlocal, since it significantly
diminished distillable entanglement. Because pbits contain at least one bit of secure key, we have already seen that distillable
key can be much larger than distillable entanglement.
However our main goal is to show that there are bound entangled states from which one can draw key. Thus we need
distillable entanglement to be strictly zero. Here it is easily seen that any perfect pdit is an NPT state. Even more, one can
show that pdits are always distillable [39]. Thus we cannot realize our goals by analysing perfect pbits.
B. Approximating pbits with PPT states
After realising that pbits cannot be bound entangled, one finds that this still does not exclude bound entangled states with
private key. Namely, even though bound entangled states cannot contain exact key (as they would be pbits then) they may
contain almost exact key. Such states would be in some sense close to pbits. Note that this would be impossible, if the only
states containing perfect key were maximally entangled state. Indeed, for d⊗ d system if only a state has greater overlap than
1/d with a maximally entangled state we can distill singlets from it [6].
Recall, that for a state with key part being two qubits, the measure of quality of the bit of key coming from measuring
the key part is trace norm of upper-right block. The key is perfect if the norm is 1/2 (we have then pbit) and it is close to
perfect, if the norm is close to 1/2. Thus our first goal will be to find bound entangled states having the trace norm of that
block arbitrarily close to 1/2. We will actually construct such PPT states (hence bound entangled) in Sections X-A, X-B. In
this way we will show that there exist bound entangled states that contain an arbitrarily (though not perfectly) secure bit of
key.
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C. Nonzero rate of key from bound entangled states
It is not enough to construct bound entangled states with arbitrary secure single bit of key. The next important step is to
show that given many copies of BE states one can draw nonzero asymptotic rate of secure key. To show this we will employ
(in Section X-C) the BE states with almost perfect bit of key. Let us outline here the most direct way of proving the claim.
To be more specific, we will consider many copies of states ρǫ which have upper-right block trace norm equal to 1/2−ǫ. We
will argue that one can get key by measuring the key part of each of them, and then process via local classical manipulations
and public discussion the outcomes. How to see that one can get nonzero rate in this way?
We will first argue, that the situation is the same, as if the outcomes were obtained from a state which is close to maximally
entangled. To this end we will apply the idea of privacy squeezing described in Section II-B.
First recall, that we have shown that operation of twisting does not change security of ccq state - more precisely, it does not
change the state of the Eve’s system and key part of Alice and Bob systems, which would arise, if Alice and Bob measured
the key part. Thus whatever twisting we will apply, from cryptographic point of view the situation will not change. The total
state will change, yet this can be noticed only by those who have access to the shield of Alice and Bob systems, and Eve does
not have such access.
We will choose such a twisting, that will change the upper-right block of ρǫ into a positive operator. This is exactly the
one which realizes privacy squeezing of this state. Now, even though security is not changed, the state is changed in a very
favorable way for our purposes. Namely, we can now trace out the shield, and the remaining state of the key part (a p-squeezed
state of the initial one) will be close to maximally entangled. Indeed, twisting does not change trace norm of the upper-right
block. Because now the block is a positive operator, its trace norm is equal to its trace, and tracing out shield amounts just
to evaluating trace of blocks. Since the trace norm was 1/2 − ǫ, the upper-right element of the state of key part is is equal
to 1/2 − ǫ, which means that state is close to maximally entangled (where the corresponding element is equal to 1/2). One
can worry, that it is now not guaranteed that the security is the same, because we have performed not only twisting, but also
partial trace over shield. However the latter operation could only make situation worse, since partial trace means giving the
traced system to Eve.
Now the only remaining thing is to show that we can draw key from data obtained by measuring many copies of state close
to an EPR state, then definitely we can draw key from many copies of more secure ccq state obtained from our ρǫ. To achieve
the goal, we thus need some results about drawing key from ccq state. Let us recall that we work in scenario, where Alice and
Bob are promised to share i.i.d. state, so that the ccq state is tensor product of identical copies. In this case, the needed results
have been provided in [19]. It follows, that the rate of key is at least I(A : B) − I(A : E), where I is mutual information.
If instead of almost-EPR state, we have just an EPR state, the above quantity is equal to 1. Indeed, perfect correlations, and
perfect randomness of outcomes gives I(A : B) = 1 and purity of the EPR state gives I(A : E) = 0. Since we have state
close to an EPR state, due to continuity of entropies, we will get I(A : B) ≈ 1, and I(A : E) ≈ 0. Thus given n copies of
states that approximate pbits one can get almost n bits of key in limit of large n.
D. Drawing key and transforming into pbits by LOCC
Apart from showing that key can be drawn from BE states, we want to develop the theory of key distillation from quantum
states. To this end in Section VIII we recast definition of distilling key in terms of distilling pbits by local operations and
classical communication. This is important change of viewpoint: drawing key requires referring to Eve; while distilling pbits
by LOCC concerns solely bipartite states shared by Alice and Bob, and never requires explicit referring to Eve’s system. Thus
we are able to pass from the game involving three parties: Alice, Bob and Eve to the two players game, involving only Alice
and Bob.
We will employ two basic tools: (i) the concept of making a protocol coherent; (ii) the fact (which we will prove) that
having almost perfectly secure ccq state is equivalent to having a state close to some pdit. Note that in one direction, the
reasoning is very simple: if we can get nonzero rate of asymptotically perfect pdits by LOCC, we can also measure them at
the end, and get in this way asymptotically perfect ccq states, which is ensured by item (ii) above. The converse direction is
a little bit more involved: we take any protocol that produces key, apply it coherently, and this gives pure final state of Alice,
Bob and Eve’s systems. From (ii) it follows, that the total state of Alice and Bob must be close to pdit.
Let us briefly discuss how we will show the fact (ii). The essential observation is that both the ccq state ρ˜ABE and Alice
and Bob total state ρABA′B′ are reductions of the same pure state ψABA′B′E . Here some explanation is needed: in general,
since the ccq state is obtained by measurement, it is not reduction of ψABA′B′E . However, one can first apply measurement
coherently to the state ρABA′B′ . Then the ccq of the new state ρ′ABA′B′ is indeed the reduction of ψ′ABA′B′E . In the actual
proof we will proceed in a slightly different way.
Now, if we have two nearby ccq states, we can find their purifications that are close to each other too. Then also Alice and
Bob states arising when we trace out Eve’s system are close to each other (because partial trace can only make states closer).
The whole argument is slightly more complicated, but the above reasoning is the main tool.
The equivalence we obtain puts the task of drawing key into the standard picture of state manipulations by means of LOCC.
The theory of such manipulations is well developed and, in particular, there are quite general methods of obtaining bounds on
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transition rates (in our case the transition rate is just distillable key), see [35]. Indeed, we will be able to show that relative
entropy of entanglement is an upper bound for distillable key. The main idea of deriving the bound is similar to the methods
from LOCC state manipulations. However significant obstacles arise, to overcome which we have developed essentially new
tools.
VIII. TWO DEFINITIONS OF DISTILLABLE KEY: LOCC AND LOPC PARADIGMS
In this section we show that distillable amount of pdits by use of LOCC denoted by KD is equal to classical secure key
distillable by means of local operations and public communication (LOPC).
A. Distillation of pdits
We have established a family of states - pdits - which have the following property: after measurement in some basis B
they give a perfect dit of key. In entanglement theory one of the important aims is to distill singlets (maximally entangled
states) which leads to operational measure of distillable entanglement. We will pose now an analogous task namely distilling
pdits (private states) which are of the form (8). This gives rise to a definition of distillable key i.e. maximal achievable rate of
distillation of pdits. Similarly as in the case of distillation of singlet, it is usually not possible to distill exact pdits. Therefore
the formal definition of distillable key KD will be a bit more involved.
Definition 6: For any given state ρAB ∈ B(HA⊗HB) let us consider sequence Pn of LOCC operations such that Pn(ρ⊗nAB) =
σn, where σn ∈ B(H(n)A ⊗H(n)B ). A set of operations P ≡ ∪∞n=1{Pn} is called pdit distillation protocol of state ρAB if there
holds
lim
n→∞
||σn − γdn || = 0, (102)
where γdn is a pdit whose key part is of dimension dn × dn.
For given protocol P , its rate is given by
R(P) = lim sup
n→∞
log dn
n
(103)
The distillable key of state ρAB is given by
KD(ρAB) = sup
P
R(P). (104)
In other words, due to this definition, Alice and Bob given n copies of state ρAB try to get a state which is close to some
pdit state with d = dn. Unlike so far in entanglement theory, effect of distillation of quantum key depends not only on the
number n of copies of initial state but also on the choice of the output state. This is because private dits appears not to be
reversibly transformable with each other by means of LOCC operations, as it is in case of maximally entangled states in
LOCC entanglement distillation. Thus the quantity KD is a rate of distillation to the large class of states. (Of course, since
the definition involves optimization, KD is well defined; in particular the expensive pdits will be suppressed).
One can be interested now if this new parameter of states KD(ρ) has an operational meaning for quantum cryptography.
One connection is obvious: given a quantum state Alice and Bob may try to distill some pdit state, and hence get (according
to the above definition) KD(ρAB) bits of key if such distillation has nonzero rate. However the question arises: is it the best
way of extraction of a classical secure key from a quantum state? I.e. given a quantum state is the largest amount of classical
key distillable from a state equal to KD. We will give to this question a positive answer now. It means, that distilling private
dits i.e. states of the form (24) is the best way of distilling classical key from a quantum state.
B. Distillable classical secure key: LOPC paradigm
The issue of drawing classical secure key from a quantum state is formally quite different from the definition of drawing
pdits. However it will turn out that it is essentially the same thing. In the LOCC paradigm, we have an initial state ρ hold by
Alice and Bob who apply to it an LOCC map, and obtain a final state ρ′. Thus the LOCC paradigm is essentially a bipartite
paradigm.
In the paradigm of drawing secure classical key (see e.g. [12], [13]), there are three parties, Alice, Bob and Eve. They
start with some joint state ρABE where subsystems A,B,E belong to Alice, Bob and Eve respectively. Now, Alice and Bob
essentially perform again some LOCC operations. However we have now a tripartite system, and we should know how that
operation act on the whole system.
Definition 7: An operation Λ belongs to LOPC class if it is composition of
(i) Local Alice (Bob) operations, i.e. operations of the form ΛA ⊗ IBE (or ΛB ⊗ IAE).
(ii) Public communication from Alice to Bob (and from Bob to Alice). E.g. the process of communication from Alice to Bob
is described by the following map
Λ(ρaABE) =
∑
i
PiρaABEPi ⊗ |i〉b〈i| ⊗ |i〉e〈i| (105)
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where Pi = IABE ⊗ |i〉a〈i|. Here the subsystem a carries the message to be sent, and the subsystems b and e of Bob and
Eve represent the received message.
Let us note, that LOCC operations can be defined in the same way, the only difference is that we drop Eve’s systems (both
E and e) and corresponding operators.
Now, drawing secure key means obtaining the following state
ρccqideal =
d−1∑
i=0
1
d
|ii〉〈ii|AB ⊗ ρE (106)
by means of LOPC. Since output states usually can not be exactly ρccqideal Alice and Bob will get state of the ccq form (4) i.e.
ρccqreal =
d∑
i,j=1
pij |ij〉AB〈ij| ⊗ ρEij (107)
There are two issues here: first, Alice and Bob should have almost perfect correlations, second, Eve states should have small
correlations with states |ij〉 of Alice and Bob systems. The first condition refers to uniformity, the second one to security.
There are several ways of quantifying these correlations, and some of them are equivalent. To quantify security [3] one can
use Holevo function of distilled ccq state, namely:
χ(ρccq) ≡ S(ρE)−
d∑
i,j=1
pijS(ρij) ≤ ǫ (108)
where S(ρ) = Trρ log ρ denotes von Neumann entropy, and
ρE =
d∑
i,j=1
pijρij . (109)
Alternatively, one can use similar condition based on norm∑
ij
pij‖ρE − ρEij‖ ≤ ǫ (110)
The condition of maximal correlations between Alice and Bob (uniformity) can be of the following form
||
d∑
i,j=1
pij |ij〉〈ij| − 1
d
d∑
i=1
|ii〉〈ii||| ≤ ǫ (111)
One can also use again the trace norm between the real state (107) that is obtained and the ideal desired state (106) as done
in [19], which includes both maximal correlations condition as well as security condition. The condition says that the state
ρccqreal obtained by Alice and Bob is closed to some ideal state
‖ρccqreal − ρccqideal‖ ≤ ǫ (112)
We will discuss relations between this condition, and security criteria (108) and (110) as well as with uniformity criterion
(111) in Appendix XV-C .
For the purpose of definition of secret key rate in this paper, we apply the joint criterion (112). Consequently, we adopt the
following measure of distillable classical secure key from a quantum tripartite state:
Definition 8: For any given state ρABE ∈ B(HA ⊗HB ⊗HC) let us consider sequence Pn of LOPC protocols such that
Pn(ρ
⊗n
ABE) = β
′
n, where β′n is ccq state
β′n =
dn−1∑
i,j=0
pij |ij〉〈ij|AB ⊗ ρEij (113)
from B(H(n)) = B(H(n)A ⊗ H(n)B ⊗ H(n)E ) with dimH(n)A = dimH(n)B = dn. A set of operations P ≡ ∪∞n=1{Pn} is called
classical key distillation protocol of state ρAB if there holds
lim
n→∞
||β′n − βdn || = 0, (114)
where βdn ∈ B(H(n) is of the form
1
dn
( dn∑
i=1
|ii〉AB〈ii|
)⊗ ρEn , (115)
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ρEn are arbitrary states from B(H(n)E ). The rate of a protocol P is given by
R(P) = lim sup
n→∞
log dn
n
(116)
Then the distillable classical key of state ρABE is defined as supremum of rates
CD(ρABE) = sup
P
R(P). (117)
The above definition works for any input tripartite state ρABE . However in this paper we are only interested in the case
where the total state is pure. The latter is determined by state ρAB = TrEρABE up to unitary transformations on Eve’s side.
Since from the very definition CD does not change under such transformations, the latter freedom is not an issue, so that we
can say the state ρAB completely determines the total state. Thus we get definition of distillable classical secure key from
bipartite state ρAB
Definition 9: For given bipartite state ρAB the distillable classical secure key is given by
CD(ρAB) ≡ CD(ψABE) (118)
where ψABE purification of ρAB .
C. Comparison of paradigms
Let us compare two definitions 6 and 9 of distilling cryptographical key. The difference is mostly that the first one deals
only with bipartite system, and the goal is to get the desired final state by applying a class of LOCC operations. Within the
second paradigm, we have tripartite state and we want to get a wanted state by means of LOPC operations. Thus the first
paradigm is much more standard in quantum information theory. The second one comes from classical security theory (see
e.g. [43]), where probability distributions of triples of random variables P (X,Y, Z) are being processed.
In the next section we will see that if the tripartite initial state is pure, the two paradigms are tightly connected. In the case of
distillation of exact key, they are almost obviously identical, while in the inexact case, the only issue is to make the asymptotic
security requirements equivalent. We will see that an output pdit obtained by LOCC implies some ccq state obtained by LOPC,
and vice versa.
D. Composability issues
In the present paper we consider the promised scenario, which is the first step to consider in unconditionally secure QKD.
1
. The latter security definition is required to be universally composable, which means that a QKD protocol can be used as a
subroutine of any other cryptographic protocol [4], [3], [47]. To this end, one needs to choose carefully the measure of security.
Our starting point is the LOPC paradigm, where the measure of security is the trace norm. This is compatible with [3], where
it was shown that such security measure implies indeed composability (see eq. (10) of [3]). In particular, if we concatenate n
QKD protocols with security ǫ measured by trace norm between the obtained state and the ideal target, the overall protocol
will have security bounded by nǫ. Thus trace norm in LOPC paradigm can be called composable security condition.
However, we want to recast QKD within the LOCC paradigm, i.e. in terms of distance between Alice and Bob states rather
than tripartite states. In this spirit, in [3] it is shown that fidelity with maximally entangled state implies composability, in the
sense that if fidelity is 1− ǫ then the norm is bounded by √ǫ (see eq. (20) of [3]). This may seem a bit uncomfortable, because
while composing many protocols we have now to add not epsilons, but rather their square roots. However one can see that
it is in general not possible to do better while starting from fidelity. Due to inequality 1 − F (σ, ρ) ≤ 12 ||ρ− σ|| [26] we can
equally well use the trace norm. Indeed it will give us at worse the
√
ǫ bound for composable security condition in the LOPC
paradigm.
In our paper we have a more general situation, i.e. we deal with distance to private states rather than just maximally entangled
states. According to the above discussion, we have decided to use trace norm in LOCC scenario. In our techniques, in the
mid-steps we shall use fidelity, hence we are again left with
√
ǫ. We do not know, whether one can omit fidelity, and get rid
of the square root.
Having said all that, we should emphasize that finally the minimal requirement is that security is an exponentially decreasing
function of some security parameter, whose role can play e.g. the number of all qubits in the game. This condition is of course
not spoiled by square root. (Example of a situation, where this requirement is not met was conjectured in [3] and then proved
in [41]). In our paper we shall derive equivalences between various security conditions, and the word “equivalence” will be
understood in the sense of not spoiling the proper exponential dependence on total number of qubits. In particular, the security
conditions will be called equivalent also when they differ by the factor polynomial in number of qubits (see e.g. [30]).
1The next step was subsequently done in papers [33], [32]
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IX. EQUALITY OF KEY RATES IN LOCC AND LOPC PARADIGMS
In this section we will show that definitions 6 and 9 give rise to the same quantities. In this way the problem of drawing key
within original LOPC paradigm is recast in terms of transition to a desired state by LOCC. First we will describe a coherent
version of LOPC protocol. Then we will use it to derive equivalence in exact case (where protocols produce as outputs ideal
ccq states or ideal pdits). Subsequently we will turn to the general case where inexact transitions are allowed.
A. Coherent version of LOPC key distillation protocol
The main difference between LOPC and LOCC paradigms is that in the first one we have transformations between tripartite
states shared by Alice, Bob and Eve, while in the latter one - between bipartite states shared by Alice and Bob. Thus in
LOPC paradigm, the part of the state held by Alice and Bob does not, in general tell us about security. To judge if Alice and
Bob have secure key we need the whole ρABE state. Security is assured by the lack of correlations of this state with Eve.
Thus if we want to recast the task of drawing key in terms of LOCC paradigm, we need to consider such LOCC protocol
which produces output state that assure security of key itself. We will do this by considering coherent version of LOPC key
distillation protocols (cf. [40], [19]).
The most important feature of the version will be that given any LOPC protocol, starting with some initial pure state ψABE
and ending up with some ccq state ρABE , its coherent version will end up with a state ψ′AA′BB′E such that tracing out A′B′
part will give exactly the ccq state ρABE . In this way, the total Alice and Bob state ρAA′BB′ will keep the whole information
about Eve (because up to unitary on Eve’s system, purification is unique).
In coherent version of key distillation protocol Alice and Bob perform their local operations in a coherent way i.e. by
adding ancillas, performing unitary transformations and putting aside appropriate parts of the system. This additional part
of the system is discarded in the usual protocol. However, holding this part allows one to keep the total state of Alice Bob
and Eve pure in each step of the protocol. This is because we use pure ancillas, pure initial state and apply only unitary
transformations which preserve purity.
Alice and Bob can also perform public communication. Its coherent version is that e.g. Bob and Eve apply C-NOT operations
to Alice’s subsystem which holds the result of measurement.
Formally, the coherent version of process of communication from definition 7 is an operation of the form
Λ(ρaABE) = U(ρaABE ⊗ |0〉a′〈0| ⊗ |0〉b〈0| ⊗ |0〉e〈0|)U † (119)
where
U = IABE ⊗
∑
i
|i〉a〈i| ⊗ U (i)a′ ⊗ U (i)b ⊗ U (i)e (120)
with unitary transformation U (i)e ,U (i)b satisfying U
(i)
e |0〉e = |i〉e and similarly for U (i)b , U (i)a′ . To finalize the operation, Alice
puts aside the system a′.
Such a coherent version of LOPC protocol has the following two features: (i) keeps the state pure. (ii) after tracing out
subsystems that are put aside we obtain exactly the same state as in the original protocol.
Now we are in position to construct for a given LOPC protocol a suitable LOCC protocol, which will output pbits when
the former protocol will output ideal key. Namely, the local operations from LOPC protocol, we replace with their coherent
versions. The public communication we take in original - incoherent - form (of course, without broadcast to Eve since we now
deal with bipartite states). One notes that such operation produces the same state of Alice and Bob as the one produced by
coherent version of the original LOPC protocol traced out over Eve’s system. This is because, if we trace out Eve, then there
is no difference between coherent and incoherent versions of public communication.
Thus from an LOPC protocol we have obtained some LOCC protocol - a special one, where local systems are not traced
out. In this way one gets a bridge which joins the two approaches, and shows that different definitions of distillable key are
equivalent. In particular, suppose that the LOPC protocol produced the ideal ccq state. Then the output of LOCC protocol
obtained as a coherent version of this protocol will produce a state which (due to theorem 2) must be a pdit.
Remark 3: Of course, the notion of coherent version need not concern just some LOPC protocol. Also an LOCC operation,
that contained measurements and partial traces can be made coherent, which in view of the above considerations means
simply, that the systems are not traced out, but only ”kept aside” and measurements are replaced by appropriate local unitaries.
Actually, if we include all pure ancillas that will be added in the course of realizing the LOCC operation, the coherent version
of the operation is nothing but a closed LOCC operation [37] introduced for sake of counting local resources such as local
information. One can think of the shield part, as being the state of all the lab equipment and quantum states, left over from
the process of key distillation.
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B. Equivalence of paradigms: The case of exact key
Here we will consider the ideal case, where the distillation of the key gives exactly the demanded output state. One can
state it formally and observe:
Proposition 5: Let KexactD and CexactD denote optimal rates achievable by LOPC and LOCC protocols which as outputs
have exact ccq states (106) and pdit states (24), respectively. Then for any state ρAB we have
KexactD (ρAB) = C
exact
D (ρAB) (121)
Proof: If after LOPC protocol P , Alice and Bob obtained exact d× d ccq state (106), then the coherent application of P
due to theorem 2 and discussion of section IX-A will produce pdit of the same dimension. Conversely, if by LOCC Alice and
Bob can get a pdit, then after measurement, again by theorem 2, they will obtain exact ccq state (106) of the same dimension.
C. Distillation of classical key and distillation of pdits - equivalence in general (asymptotically exact) case
We will prove here the theorem, which implies, that even in nonexact case, distillation of pdits from initial bipartite state
by LOCC is equivalent to distillation of key by LOPC from initial pure state, that is purification of the bipartite state. This in
turn means that the rates in both paradigms are equal.
Theorem 5: Let Alice and Bob share a state ρ such that Eve has it’s purification. Then the following holds: if Alice and
Bob can distill by LOPC operations a state such that with Eve’s subsystem it is ccq state i.e. of the form
ρABE =
d∑
i,j=1
pij |ij〉〈ij|AB ⊗ ρEij , (122)
with ||ρccqABE − ρccqideal|| ≤ ǫ, then they can distill by LOCC operations a state ρout which is close to some pdit state γ in trace
norm:
||ρout − γ|| ≤
√
2ǫ, (123)
where the key part of a pdit γ is of dimension d× d.
Conversely, if by LOCC they can get state ρout satisfying ||ρout − γ|| ≤ ǫ, then by LOPC they can get state ρccq satisfying
||ρccqABE − ρccqideal|| ≤
√
2ǫ
Proof: The ”if” part of this theorem is proven as follows. By assumption Alice and Bob are able to get by some LOPC
protocol P a ccq state ρABE satisfying
||ρccqABE − ρccqideal|| ≤ ǫ. (124)
Now by equivalence between norm and fidelity (Eq. (13) of Appendix) we can rewrite this inequality as follows
F (ρccqABE , ρ
ccq
ideal) > 1−
1
2
ǫ. (125)
By definition of fidelity
F (ρ, σ) = max
ψ,φ
|〈ψ|φ〉| (126)
where maximum is taken over all purifications ψ and φ of ρ and σ respectively, we can fix one of these purification arbitrarily,
and optimise over the other one. Let us then choose such a purification ψABA′B′E of ρccqABE which is the output of coherent
application of the mentioned protocol P . There exists purification φABA′B′E of ρideal such that it’s overlap with ψ is greater
than 1− 12ǫ. Since the fidelity can only increase after partial trace applied to both the states, it will be still greater than 1− 12ǫ
once we trace over Eve’s subsystem. Thus we have
F (ρψABA′B′ , σ
φ
ABA′B′) > 1−
1
2
ǫ. (127)
where σφABA′B′ and ρ
ψ
ABA′B′ are partial traces of φ and ψ respectively. The state σ
φ
ABA′B′ (partial trace of φ) comes from
purification of an ideal state, and by the very definition it is some pdit state γ. At the same time, the state ρψABA′B′ (partial
trace of ψ) is the one which is the output of coherent application of protocol P . Thus by coherent version of P Alice and
Bob can obtain state close to pdit which proves the ”if” part of the theorem.
To obtain equivalence let us prove now the converse implication. The proof is a sort of ”symmetric reflection” of the proof
of the previous part.
This time we assume that there exists LOCC protocol starting with ρ, ending up with final state ρout with key part od d× d
dimension which is close to some pdit in norm i.e.
||ρout − γ|| ≤ ǫ. (128)
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Due to equivalence between fidelity and norm, we have
F (ρout, γ) ≥ 1− ǫ/2 (129)
The total state after protocol is ψABA′B′E , and if partially traced over Eve it returns ρout. Then we can find such φ, purification
of γ, that F (ψ, φ) > 1− ǫ. Now let Alice and Bob measure the key part and trace out the shield. Then out of ψ we get some
ccq state ρccqout. The same operation applied to φ gives ideal ccq state (106) ρccqideal. The operation can only increase the fidelity,
so that
F (ρccqout, ρ
ccq
ideal) ≥ 1− ǫ/2 (130)
Returning to norms we get
||ρccqout − ρccqideal|| ≤
√
2ǫ. (131)
X. DISTILLING KEY FROM BOUND ENTANGLED STATES
In this section we will provide a family of states. Then we will show that for certain regions of parameters they have positive
partial transpose (which means that they are non-distillable). Subsequently, we shall show that out of the above PPT states
one can produce, by an LOCC operation, states arbitrarily close to pbits (which also implies that they are entangled, hence
bound entangled). More precisely, for any ǫ we will find PPT states, from which by a LOCC protocol, one gets with some
probability a state ǫ-close to some pbit. Since LOCC preserves the PPT property, this shows that pbits can be approximated
with arbitrary accuracy by PPT states, in sharp contrast with maximally entangled states. We then show how to get from a
state sufficiently close to a pbit with non vanishing asymptotic rate of key. We obtain it by reducing the problem to drawing
key from states that are close to the maximally entangled state.
A. The new family of PPT states ...
Here we will present a family of states, and will determine the range of parameters for which the states are PPT. The idea
of construction of the family is based on the so called hiding states found by Eggeling and Werner in [22]. Let us briefly recall
this result. In [52], [20] it was shown that one can hide one bit of information in two states by correlating the bit of information
with a pair of states which are almost indistinguishable by use of LOCC operations, yet being almost distinguishable by global
operations. The resulting state with the hidden bit is of the form:
ρhb =
1
2
|0〉〈0|AB ⊗ ρ1hiding +
1
2
|1〉〈1| ⊗ ρ2hiding (132)
In [22] it was shown that there are separable states, which can serve as arbitrarily good hiding states. These states are
τ1 = (
ρs + ρa
2
)⊗k, τ2 = (ρs)⊗k, (133)
where ρs and ρa are symmetric and antisymmetric Werner states (50). The higher is the parameter k, the more indistinguishable
by LOCC protocols the states become.
We adopt the idea of hiding bits to hide entanglement. Namely instead of bits one can correlate two orthogonal maximally
entangled states with these two hiding states and get the state:
ρhe =
1
2
|ψ+〉〈ψ+|AB ⊗ τA
′B′
1 +
1
2
|ψ−〉〈ψ−|AB ⊗ τA
′B′
2 (134)
Let us recall, that our purpose is to get the family of states which though entangled are not distillable, and can approximate
pdit states. Then the choice of ρhe as a starting point has double advantage. First, because τ1 and τ2 are hiding, ρhe will not
allow for distillation of entanglement by just distinguishing them. Second, the hiding states are separable, so they do not bring
in any entanglement to the state ρhe. However the state (134) is obviously NPT. Indeed, consider partial transposition of BB′
system. It is composition of partial transpositions of B and B′ subsystems. If one applies it to the state (134), one gets
ρΓABA′B′ = (IA ⊗ TB ⊗ IA′ ⊗ TB′)(ρABA′B′) =
=


1
2 (
τ1+τ2
2 )
Γ 0 0 0
0 0 12 (
τ1−τ2
2 )
Γ
0
0 12 (
τ1−τ2
2 )
Γ 0 0
0 0 0 12 (
τ1+τ2
2 )
Γ


(135)
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where Γ denotes partial transposition over subsystem B′ (as partial transposition over B caused interchange of blocks of matrix
of (134)). This matrix is obviously not positive for the lack of middle-diagonal blocks. To prevent this we admix a separable
state 12 (|01〉〈01|+ |10〉〈10|)⊗ τ2 with a probability (1− 2p), where p ∈ (0, 12 ]. It’s matrix reads then
ρ(p,d,k) =


p( τ1+τ22 ) 0 0 p(
τ1−τ2
2 )
0 (12 − p)τ2 0 0
0 0 (12 − p)τ2 0
p( τ1+τ22 ) 0 0 p(
τ1+τ2
2 )

 , (136)
In subscript we explicitly write the parameters on which this state depends implicitly: d = dA′ = dB′ is the dimension of
symmetric and antisymmetric Werner states used for hiding states (133) and k is parameter of tensoring in their construction.
We shall see, that for some range of p, almost every state of this family is a PPT state. We formalise it in the next lemma.
Lemma 5: Let ρa ∈ B(Cd ⊗ Cd) and ρb ∈ B(Cd ⊗ Cd) be symmetric and antisymmetric Werner states respectively, and let
k be such that
τ1 = (
ρs + ρa
2
)⊗k, τ2 = (ρs)⊗k (137)
holds. Then for any p ∈ (0, 13 ] and any k there exists d such that state (136) has positive partial transposition. More specifically,
the state (136) is PPT if and only if the following conditions are fulfilled
0 < p ≤ 1
3
(138)
1− p
p
≥
(
d
d− 1
)k
For the proof of this lemma see Appendix XV-B.
B. ... can approximate pdits
We have just established a family ρ(p,d,k) such that for certain p, k and d they are PPT states. We will then show, that by
LOCC one can transform some of them to a state close to pbits. More precisely, for any fixed accuracy, we will always find p,
d and k such that it is possible to reach pbit up to this accuracy, starting from some number of copies of ρ(p,d,k) and applying
LOCC operations.
Subsequently, we will show that one can always choose the initial states ρ(p,d,k) to be PPT. Since LOCC operations do not
change PPT property, we will in this way show that there are PPT states that approximate pbits to arbitrarily high accuracy.
We will first prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6: For any ǫ > 0 and any p ∈ (14 , 1] there exist state ρ from family of state {ρ(p,d,k)} (136) such that for some m
from ρ⊗m one can get by LOCC (with nonzero probability of success) a state σ satisfying ||σ − γ|| ≤ ǫ for some private bit
γ.
Proof: First of all let us notice that by theorem 4 it is enough to show, that one can transform ρ⊗m into a state ρ′ which
has sufficiently large norm of the upper-right block.
Let Alice and Bob share m copies of a state ρ from the family (136). The number m and parameters (p, k, d) of this state
will be fixed later.
Now let Alice and Bob apply the well known recurrence protocol - ingredient of protocols of distillation of singlet states
[8]. Namely they take one system in state ρ as source system, and iterate the following procedure. In i-th step they take one
system in state ρ, and treat it as a target system. Let us remind that both systems have four subsystems A, B, A′ and B′. To
distinguish the source and target system, the corresponding subsystems of a target system we call A˜, B˜, A˜′, B˜′. On the source
and target system they both perform a CNOT gate with a source at the A(B) part of a source system and target at A˜(B˜)
part of a target system for Alice (Bob) respectively. Then, they both measure the A˜ and B˜ subsystem of the target system in
computational basis respectively, and compare the results. If the results agree, they proceed the protocol, getting rid of the A˜B˜
subsystem. If they do not agree, they abort the protocol. With nonzero probability of success they can perform this operation
m − 1 times having each time the same source system, and some fresh target system in state ρ. That is they start with m
systems in state ρ and in each step (upon success) they use up one system and pass to the next step.
One can easily check, that the submatrices (blocks) of the state ρrec(p,d,k) which survives m−1 steps of this recurrence protocol
(which clearly happens with nonzero probability) are equal to the m-fold tensor power of the elements of initial matrix ρ(p,d,k):
ρrec(p,d,k) =
1
N


[p( τ1+τ22 )]
⊗m 0 0 [p( τ1−τ22 )]
⊗m
0 [(12 − p)τ2]⊗m 0 0
0 0 [(12 − p)τ2]⊗m 0
[p( τ1−τ22 )]
⊗m
0 0 [p( τ1+τ22 )]
⊗m

 . (139)
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where the normalisation is given by
N = Tr[ρrec(p,d,k)] = 2p
m + 2(
1
2
− p)m. (140)
Let us consider the upper-right block A˜0011 of the matrix (139) without normalisation. Norm of this block is equal to
‖A˜0011‖ =
(p
2
)m
||(ρa − ρs
2
)⊗k − ρs⊗k|| =(p
2
)m (
2(1− 2−k))m = pm(1− 2−k)m. (141)
where second equality is consequence of the fact, that ρa and ρs have orthogonal supports which gives that ρ⊗ks is orthogonal
to any term in expansion of (ρa−ρs2 )
⊗k but the one 1
2k
ρ⊗ks . Thus the result is equal to norm of [(
ρa−ρs
2 )
⊗k− 1
2k
ρ⊗ks ] (which is
(1− 1
2k
)) plus norm of the difference | 1
2k
ρ⊗ks − ρ⊗ks | which gives the above formula. Thus the norm of the upper-right block
A0011 of the state (139) is given by
‖A0011‖ = 1
N
‖A˜0011‖ = 1
2
(1− 1
2k
)m
1
1 + (1−2p2p )
m
. (142)
We want now to see, if we can make the norm to be arbitrary close to 1/2. (then by Lemma 4 the state will be arbitrary close
to a pbit). Since p > 14 , we get that (1−2p2p )m converges to 0 with m. Although increasing m diminishes the term (1− 12k )m,
we can first fix k large enough, so that the whole expression (142) will be as close to 12 as it is required.
Now we have the following situation. We know that for p ∈ (14 , 1] if 12 (1 − 12k )m 11+( 1−2p
2p
)m
is close to 1/2, then the state
(139) is close to pbit. On the other hand, from lemma (5) it follows that for (i) p ∈ (0, 1/3] and (ii) 1−p
p
≥ ( d
d−1
)k
the state
ρ(p,d,k) is PPT, hence also the state (139) is PPT (because it was obtained from the former one by LOCC operation). If we
now fix p from interval (1/4, 1/3], then by choosing high m and for such m, high enough k, then the state (139) is close to
pbit. Now, we can fix also m and k, and choose d so large that the condition (ii) is also fulfilled so that the state becomes
PPT. This proves the following theorem, which is main result of this section.
Theorem 7: PPT states can be arbitrarily close to pbit in trace norm.
Here might be the appropriate place to note an amusing property of state (134): Namely, Eve knows one bit of information
about Alice and Bob’s state – she knows the phase of their Bell state. But she only has one bit of information about their
state, thus it cannot be that she also knows the bit of their state, which is the key. In some sense, giving Eve the bit of phase
information, means that she cannot know the bit value.
C. Distillation of secure key
In the previous subsection we have shown that private bits can be approximated by PPT states. Now, the question is whether
given many copies of one of such PPT states Alice and Bob can get nonzero rate of classical key. Below, we will give the
positive answer.
The main idea of the proof is to show that from the PPT state which is close to pbit Alice and Bob by measuring, can
obtain ccq state satisfying conditions of protocol (DW) found by Devetak and Winter [19]. Namely, they have shown that for
an initial cqq state (state which is classical only on Alice side; this includes ccq state as special case) between Alice, Bob and
Eve,
CD(ρABE) ≥ I(A : B)− I(A : E) (143)
Here I(A : B) stands for the quantum mutual information of the state ρ with subsystems A and B given by
I(A : B) = S(A) + S(B)− S(AB), (144)
where S(X) stands for the von Neumann entropy of X (sub)system of the state ρ.
Using the above result we can prove now, that from many copies of states close to a pbit, one can draw nonzero asymptotic
rate of key.
Lemma 6: If a state ρ is close enough to pbit in trace norm, then KD(ρ) > 0.
Proof: The idea of the proof is as follows. Suppose that σ is close to pbit γ. We then consider twisting that changes γ
into basic pbit P+AB ⊗σA′B′ with some state σ on A′B′. We apply twisting to both states, so that they are still close to each
other. Of course, this is only a mathematical tool: Alice and Bob cannot apply twisting, which is usually a nonlocal operation.
The main point is that after twisting, according to theorem 1 the ccq state does not change. If we now trace out systems A′B′
the resulting state will be close to maximally entangled, and the resulting ccq state – at most worse from Alice and Bob point
of view (because tracing out means giving to Eve). What we have done is just privacy squeezing of the state ρ. Now, the
latter ccq state has come from measurement of a state close to the maximally entangled one. Thus the task reduces to estimate
quantities I(A : B) and I(A : E) for a ccq state obtained from measuring the maximally entangled state. However due to
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suitable continuities, first one is close to 1 and second one close to 0. Now by DW protocol, one can draw a pretty high rate
of key from such ccq state. Let us now proceed with the formal proof.
We assume that for some pbit γ we have
||ρ− γ|| ≤ ǫ. (145)
Let us consider twisting U which changes pdit γ into a basic pdit. Existence of such U is assured by theorem 2. If both states
γ and ρ are subjected to this transformation, the norm is preserved, so that
||UρU † − UγU †|| ≤ ǫ. (146)
Also due to theorem 1 the ccq state obtained by measuring key part of UρU † is the same as that from ρ. Now, the amount of
key drawn from such ccq state will not increase if we trace out shield. Thus we apply such partial trace to UρU † and to γ,
and by monotonicity of trace norm get
||ρ˜AB − P+AB|| ≤ ǫ. (147)
It is now enough to show that from ccq state obtained by measuring ρ˜AB (where Eve holds the rest of its purification) one
can get nonzero rate of key.
To this end let us note, that for ccq state obtained from any bipartite state ρAB by measuring its purification on subsystems
A and B in computational basis, we have the following bound for I(A : E):
I(A : E)ccq ≤ S(ρAB). (148)
Now, since our state ρ˜AB is close to P+, for which S(P+) = 0 and I(A : B) = 1, we can use continuity of entropy, to bound
these quantities for the state. ¿From Fannes inequality (see eq. 14 in Sec. II-A), we get
I(A : B)ccq ≥ 1− 4ǫ log dAB − h(ǫ), (149)
I(A : E)ccq ≤ S(ρ˜AB) ≤ 8ǫ− h(ǫ). (150)
To get first estimate, it is enough to note, that due to monotonicity of trace norm, the estimate (147) is also valid if we dephase
the state ρ˜AB and P+AB . Thus we obtain that
KD(ρ) ≥ I(A : B)− I(A : E) ≥ 1− 16ǫ (151)
This ends the proof of the lemma.
Let us note here, that it was not necessary to know, that the state ρ is close to pbit. Rather, It was enough to know that trace
norm of upper right block is close to 1/2, as we have proved that it is equivalent to previous condition (see Sec. V). ¿From
this it follows, that after twisting, and tracing out A′B′ the resulting state ρ˜ is close to the EPR state, which ensures nonzero
rate of key (actually the rate is close to 1).
We now can combine the lemma with the fact that we know PPT states that are close to pbit, to obtain that there exist
PPT states from which one can draw secure key. The states must be entangled, as from separable states one cannot draw key.
Namely separable state can be established by public discussion. If it could then serve as a source of secret key, one could
obtain secret key by public discussion which can not be possible. For formal arguments see [17]. Thus our PPT states are
entangled. But, since they are PPT, one cannot distill singlets from them [36], hence they are bound entangled. In this way
we have obtained the following theorem
Theorem 8: There exist bound entangled states with KD > 0.
We have split the way towards bound entangled states with nonzero key into two parts. First, we have shown that from PPT
states ρ(p,d,k) by recurrence one can get a state that is close to pbit. Then we have shown, that from a state close to pbit one
can draw private key.
Note that we have two quite different steps: recurrence was the quantum operation preformed on quantum Alice and Bob
states, while Devetak-Winter protocol in our case, is classical processing of the outputs of measurement. We could unify
the picture in two ways. First Alice and Bob could measure the key part of the initial state ρ(p,d,k), and preform recurrence
classically (since the quantum recurrence is merely coherent application of classical protocol). Then the whole process of
drawing key from ρ(p,d,k) would be classical (of course, taking into account that Eve has quantum states). On the other hand,
the DW protocol could be applied coheretly, so that till the very end, we would have quantum state of Alice and Bob.
The result we have obtained allows to distinguish two measures of entanglement
Corrolary 2: Distillable entanglement and distillable classical secure key are different measures of entanglement i.e. there
are states for which there holds
KD(ρ) > D(ρ) = 0. (152)
In further section we will also show that KD is different than entanglement cost, as it is bounded by relative entropy of
entanglement.
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XI. RELATIVE ENTROPY OF ENTANGLEMENT AS UPPER BOUND ON DISTILLABLE KEY
In this section we will provide complete proof of the theorem announced [34] which gives general upper bound on distillable
key KD. This upper bound is given by regularised relative entropy of entanglement (56). The relative entropy of entanglement
[55], [54] is given by
Er(ρ) = inf
σsep
S(ρ|σsep), (153)
where S(ρ|σ) = Trρ log ρ−Trρ log σ is relative entropy, and infimum is taken over all separable states σsep. The regularized
version of Er is given by
E∞r (ρ) = lim
n
Er(ρ
⊗n)
n
. (154)
The limit exists, and due to subadditivity of Er, we have
E∞r (ρ) ≤ Er. (155)
It follows that also relative entropy of entanglement is upper bound for KD.
We recall now the following lemma obtained in [34], the proof of which we provide in Appendix XV-H:
Lemma 7: Consider a set Sτ := {UρABA′B′U † | ρABA′B′ ∈ SEP , ρABA′B′ ∈ B(Cd ⊗ Cd ⊗ CdA′ ⊗ CdB′ )} where U is
B-twisting with B being a standard product basis in Cd ⊗ Cd. Let σABA′B′ ∈ Sτ and σAB = TrA′B′σABA′B′ . We have then
S(P+|σAB) ≥ log d, (156)
where P+ = |ψ+d 〉〈ψ+d |.
We will also need asymptotic continuity of the relative entropy distance from some set of states obtained in [21] in the form
of [50].
Proposition 6: For any compact, convex set of state S that contains maximally mixed state, the relative entropy distance
from this set given by
ESr = inf
σ∈S
S(ρ||σ), (157)
is asymptotically continuous i.e. it satisfies
|ESr (ρ1)− ESr (ρ2)| < 4ǫ log d+ h(ǫ) (158)
for any states ρ1, ρ2 acting on Hilbert space H of dimension d, with ǫ = ‖ρ1 − ρ2‖ with ǫ ≤ 1.
Let us mention, that the original relative entropy of entanglement [54] has in place of S the set of separable states. Another
version has been considered in [46], where S was set of PPT states. The latter set has entangled states, but they can be only
weakly entangled. In contrast we will have set in which there may be quite strongly entangled states.
We are now in position to formulate and prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 9: For any bipartite state ρAB ∈ B(CdA ⊗ CdB ) there holds
KD(ρAB) ≤ E∞r (ρAB), (159)
Proof: By definition of KD(ρAB) there exists protocol (i.e. sequence of maps Λn), such that
Λn(ρ
⊗n) = γ′d (160)
where
lim
n
log d
n
= KD(ρAB) (161)
and
lim
n
‖γ′d − γd‖ ≡ lim
n
ǫn = 0 (162)
with γd being pdit with dimension d2 of the key part.
We will present now the chain of (in)equalities, and comment it below.
S(ρ⊗nAB|σ˜sep) ≥ S(γ′ABA′B′ |σsep) = (163)
= S(Uγγ
′
ABA′B′U
†
γ |UγσsepU †γ) ≥ (164)
≥ S(TrA′B′ [Uγγ′ABA′B′U †γ ]|TrA′B′ [UγσsepU †γ ]) (165)
≡ S(P ′+|σ) ≥ (166)
≥ infσ∈TS(P ′+|σ) := ETr (P ′+) ≥ (167)
≥ ETr (P+)− 4||P+ − P ′+|| log d− h(||P+ − P ′+||) ≥ (168)
≥ (1− 4ǫn) log d− h(ǫn) (169)
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Inequality (163) is due to the fact, that relative entropy does not increase under completely positive maps; in particular it
can not increase under LOCC action applied to it’s both arguments (second argument becomes other separable state since
LOCC operations can not create entanglement). In the next step, Eq. (164) we perform twisting Uγ controlled by the basis in
which state γm is secure (without loss of generality we can assume it is standard basis). The equality follows from the fact
that unitary transformation doesn’t change the relative entropy. Next (165) we trace out A′B′ subsystem of both states which
only decreases the relative entropy. After this operation, the first argument is P ′+, which is a state close to the EPR state P+.
(P ′+ would be equal to the EPR state if γ′ABA′B′ were exactly pdit) while second argument becomes some – not necessarily
separable – state σ. The state belongs to the set T constructed as follows. We take set of separable states on system ABA′B′
subject to twisting Uγ and subsequently trace out the A′B′ subsystem. The inequality (166) holds, because we take infimum
over all states from set T of the function S(P ′+|σ). This minimised version is named there ETr (P ′+) as it is relative entropy
distance of P ′+ from the set T .
Let us check now, that set T fulfills the conditions of proposition 6. Convexity of this set is obvious, since (for fixed unitary
Uγ) by linearity it is due to convexity of the set of separable states. This set contains the identity state, since it contains
maximally mixed separable state which is unitarily invariant (i.e. invariant under Uγ ) and whose subsystem AB by definition
is the maximally mixed state as well. Thus by proposition 6 we have that ETr is asymptotically continuous
|ETr (P ′+)− ETr (P+d )| < ||P ′+ − P+||4 log d+ h(||P ′+ − P+||), (170)
where we assume that the EPR state P+ is of local dimension d. Since P ′+ and P+ come out of γ′AB and γd by the same
transformation described above (twisting, and partial trace) which doesn’t increase norm distance, by (162) we have that
||P ′+ − P+|| ≤ ǫn. This, together with asymptotic continuity (170) implies (167). Now by lemma 7 we have
ETr (P+) ≥ log d, (171)
which gives the last inequality:
ETr (P
′
+) ≥ (1− 4ǫn) log d− h(ǫn). (172)
Summarizing this chain of inequalities (163)-(168), we have that for any separable state σ˜sep:
S(ρ⊗nAB||σ˜sep) ≥ (1 − 4ǫn) log d− h(ǫn) (173)
Taking now infimum over all separable states σ˜sep we get
Er(ρ
⊗n
AB) ≥ (1− 4ǫn) log d− h(ǫn). (174)
Now we divide both sides by n and take the limit. Then the left-hand-side converges to E∞r . Due to (162) ǫn → 0 and due
to (161), log d/n→ KD(ρAB). Thus due to continuity of h we obtain
E∞r ≥ KD (175)
As an application of the above upper bound, we consider now the relation between distillable key and entanglement cost.
For maximally entangled states these two quantities are of course equal, unlike for general pdits. As an example let us consider
again a flower state given in eq. (51). As follows from [31], the flower state has EC strictly greater than the relative entropy
of entanglement. Since by the above theorem we have KD(γflower) ≤ Er(γflower), havig Er(γflower) < EC(γflower), we
obtain in this case KD(γflower) < EC(γflower).
Let us note, that the entanglement monotone approach initiated here was then used in full extent in [13], [14]. It is shown
there, that in fact any bipartite monotone E, which is continuous and normalized on private states (i.e. E(γd) ≥ log d), is an
upper bound on distillable key. In particular it is shown that the squashed entanglement [53], [15] is also an upper bound on
distillable key.
XII. A CANDIDATE FOR NPT BOUND ENTANGLEMENT
Thus far, all known bound entangled states have positive partial transpose (are PPT). A long-standing and interesting open
question is whether there exist bound entangled states which are also NPT. If such states existed, it would imply that the
quantum channel capacity is non-additive. Since any NPT state is distillable with the aid of some PPT state [57], we would
have the curious property that one can have two states which are each non-distillable, but if you have both states, then the
joint state would be distillable.
We now present a candidate for NPT bound entangled states which are based on the states of equation (134),
ρhe =
1
2
|ψ+〉〈ψ+|AB ⊗ τA
′B′
1 +
1
2
|ψ−〉〈ψ−|AB ⊗ τA
′B′
2 (176)
and which intuitively appear to be bound entangled. Globally, the flags τA′B′i , are distinguishable, but under LOCC the flags
appear almost identical, thus after Alice and Bob attempt to distinguish the flags, the state on AB will be very close to an
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equal mixture of ψ+ and ψ−. The equal mixture of only two different EPR states is separable in dimension 2 × 2, but it is
at the edge of separability. A slight biasing of the mixture, causes the state to be entangled. Thus, if Alice and Bob are able
to obtain even a small amount of information about which τi they have, they will have a distillable state. More explicitly, if
Alice and Bob attempt distillation by first guessing which hiding state flag they have, and then grouping the remaining parts
of the states into two sets depending on their guess of the hiding state, they will be left with states of the form
ρhe = (
1
2
+ ǫ)|ψ+〉〈ψ+|AB + (1
2
− ǫ)|ψ−〉〈ψ−|AB . (177)
This state is distillable.
But what if we mix in more than two different EPR states? Namely, instead of only considering hiding states (flags) correlated
to odd parity Bell states (anti-key states) |ψ±〉 = 1√2 (|01〉 ± |10〉), we also add mix in flags correlated to the even parity Bell
states (key type states) |φ±〉 = 1√2 (|00〉 ± |11〉). Consider:
ρ = p11|φ+〉〈φ+| ⊗ ρ11 + p12|φ−〉〈φ−| ⊗ ρ12 +
+p21|ψ+〉〈ψ+| ⊗ ρ21 + p22|ψ−〉〈ψ−| ⊗ ρ22 (178)
where
ρij = τi ⊗ τj . (179)
Let us take for example, all pij = 1/4. Then, after attempting to distinguish the hiding states, Alice and Bob will have a state
which is very close to the maximally mixed state (i.e. the state will be very close to a mixture of all four Bell states). The
maximally mixed state is very far from being entangled, thus even if Alice and Bob’s measurements on the hiding states are
able to bias the mixture away from the maximally mixed state, the state will still be separable.
Intuitively, it is thus clear why the state of equation (178) will not be distillable. Any protocol which attempts to first
distinguish which Bell state the parties have, will fail. But is the state entangled? Indeed it is, in fact it has negative partial
transpose. To see this, we look at the block-matrix form of the state
ρ =
1
4


τ1 ⊗ (τ1 + τ2) 0 0 τ1 ⊗ (τ1 − τ2)
0 τ2 ⊗ (τ1 + τ2) τ2 ⊗ (τ1 − τ2) 0
0 τ2 ⊗ (τ1 − τ2) τ2 ⊗ (τ1 + τ2) 0
τ1 ⊗ (τ1 − τ2) 0 0 τ1 ⊗ (τ1 + τ2)

 (180)
If the matrix were PPT we would have in particular
τΓ1 ⊗ (τΓ1 + τΓ2 ) ≥ τΓ2 ⊗ (τΓ1 − τΓ2 ) (181)
We will argue that it is not true. Let us recall that
τΓ1 =
(
P⊥+
d2 − 1
)⊗k
τΓ2 =
(
P⊥+
d2 + d
+
(1 + d)P+
d2 + d
)⊗k
≡
(
P⊥+
d2 + d
)⊗k
+R
τΓ1 − τΓ2 =
[
(P⊥+ )
⊗k
(
1
(d2 − 1)k −
1
(d2 + d)k
)
−R
]
τΓ1 + τ
Γ
2 =
[
(P⊥+ )
⊗k
(
1
(d2 − 1)k +
1
(d2 + d)k
)
+R
]
(182)
where we use notation from sec. XI. To see that (181) is not satisfied we consider the following projector
Q = I − (P⊥+ )⊗k (183)
i.e. Q is projector onto support of positive operator R. Since Tr(QτΓ1 ) = 0, we have
Tr[(Q⊗ (P⊥+ )⊗k)(τΓ1 ⊗ (τΓ1 + τΓ2 ))] = 0 (184)
Moreover we have
Tr(Q⊗ (P⊥+ )⊗k)[τΓ2 ⊗ (τΓ1 − τΓ2 )] =
= TrR
(
1
(d2 − 1)k −
1
(d2 + d)k
)
(185)
The above quantity is strictly greater than zero for d ≥ 2. Thus inequality (181) is violated on projector Q⊗ (P⊥+ )⊗k.
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Now, it may be that there is a protocol which succeeds in distilling from the state (178) which does not rely on first
performing a measurement to distinguish the hiding states. However, even taking many copies of the state, produces a state of
the form
ρ =
∑
i
|ψi〉〈ψi| ⊗ ρi (186)
with the ρi being binary strings encoded in hiding states and ψi being the basis of maximally entangled states. Thus the form
of the state is invariant under tensoring. There is thus a very strong intuition that these states are NPT bound entangled, and
a very good understanding of why they might be so. Effectively, the partial transpose does not feel very strongly the fact that
the states ρ are hiding states, but more strongly feels the fact that they are globally orthogonal.
XIII. CONTROLLED PRIVATE QUANTUM CHANNELS
Here, we demonstrate a cryptographic application of bound entangled states which have key. A private quantum channel
(PQC)[10], [44] allows for the sending of quantum states such that an eavesdropper learns nothing about the sent states. Here,
we consider the cryptographic primitive of having the ability to securely send quantum states (a PQC), but that this ability
can be turned on and off by a controller. Namely, we consider a three party scenario (Alice, Bob, and the (C)controller) and
demand
• Alice and Bob have a private quantum channel, which they can use to send an unknown qubit from one to the other in
such a way that they can be sure that no eavesdropper (including the Controller), can gain information about the state
being sent.
• the Controller has the ability to determine whether or not Alice and Bob can send the qubit
We now show that this can be done using shared quantum states in such a way that the Controller only needs to send classical
communication to one of the parties in order to activate the channel. First, let us note that the standard way of controlling the
entanglement of two parties is via the GHZ state
|ψ〉ABC = |000〉+ |111〉 . (187)
If the Controller, (Claire), measures in the basis |0〉 ± |1〉, then, depending on the outcome, Alice and Bob will share either
the Bell state |ψ+〉 or |ψ−〉. If C then tells them the result, they will have one unit of entanglement (ebit) which they can
then use to teleport quantum states. However, if the Controller wants to give them the ability to send a single qubit securely,
then the GHZ state cannot be used for this, because the Controller can trick Alice and Bob into sending part of the quantum
state to her. She can claim that she obtained measurement outcome +, when in reality she has not performed a measurement
at all. Then, when Alice attempts to teleport a qubit to Bob, she is in fact teleporting to both Bob and the Controller. The
controller can then perform a measurement on her qubit to obtain partial information about the sent qubit. Note that here we
are concerned with the ability to give single shot access to a quantum channel. If the controller gives Alice and Bob many
ebits by performing measurements on many copies of a GHZ state, then Alice and Bob could always perform purity testing
to determine that the Controller is honest.
Let us know show that unlike the GHZ, the states of Eq. (134) can be used in such a way that the Controller can give
Alice and Bob single shot access to a private quantum channel, in such a way that Alice and Bob are sure that the Controller
cannot obtain any information about the sent states even when the Controller cheats. We will then show that we can do the
same thing with fully bound entangled states, so that Alice and Bob possess no distillable entanglement unless the Controller
gives it to them.
First, we assume the shared state as a trusted resource. I.e. a trusted party gives Alice, Bob and the Controller some state
which they use to implement the primitive. This assumption can be removed in the limit of many copies, since if Alice and
Bob have many copies of the state, they can perform tomography to ensure that they indeed possess the correct state. The
state we initially use is the purification of Eq. (134)
ρhe =
1
2
|ψ+〉〈ψ+|AB ⊗ τA
′B′
1 +
1
2
|ψ−〉〈ψ−|AB ⊗ τA
′B′
2 (188)
Namely,
|ψ〉ABC = |00〉AB ⊗ |φ1〉A′B′C + |11〉AB ⊗ |φ2〉A′B′C (189)
such that TrC(|φi〉〈φi|) = τi.
Thus, 〈φ1|φ2〉 = 0 and since the τi are orthogonal, the Controller’s states TrA′B′(|φi〉〈φi|) = σiC will be orthogonal. The
controller can thus give Alice and Bob one ebit by performing a measurement to distinguish the σiC . She then tells Alice and
Bob the result. Alice and Bob on the other hand, are guaranteed security by the fact that they either possess the state |ψ+〉
or |ψ−〉. I.e. it is an incoherent mixture of the two states, and they either have one of the states or the other, they just don’t
know which one they have.
The state of Eq. (134) however, does have an arbitrarily small amount of distillable entanglement. Thus, Alice and Bob will
have access to a private quantum channel in the case of having many copies of the state. If we want to give full control to
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Claire, we need to ensure that the state held by Alice and Bob in the absence of Claire’s communication is non-distillable.
This can be achieved by using the bound entangled states of equation (139) which approximate a pbit. It is not hard to verify,
by explicitly writing the state in the Bell basis on AB, that the state is arbitrarily close to a state of the same form as equation
(189), and thus has the desired properties.
XIV. CONCLUSION
We have seen that one can recast obtaining a private key under LOPC in terms of distilling private states under LOCC. One
finds a general class of states which are unconditionally secure. This class includes bound entangled states from which one
cannot distill pure entanglement. This then enables one to use tools developed in entanglement theory to tackle privacy theory.
For example, the regularized relative entropy of entanglement was found to be an upper bound on the rate of private key.
Many open questions remain. The most important problem in this context is whether all entangled states have non-zero
distillable key or opposite - if there are bound entangled states which cannot be distilled into private states. One can also ask
about the private state cost Kqc of states ρAB . I.e. what is the dimension d of the key part of the pdit that is required to create
ρAB under LOCC? It might even be that Kqc = Kd, which would enable entanglement theory to have basic laws along the
lines of [38].
The question of reversibility of creating states from private states touches another ”qualitative” problem, namely how tight
is the upper bound on distillable key which is the regularised relative entropy of entanglement.
Exploring the wide class of private states especially in the context of the well established theory of distillation of entanglement
appears to be a necessary step in order to solve the above important problems.
XV. APPENDIX
A. Derivation of formula (96) of Sec. VI
We show that a bipartite state of four subsystems ABA′B′ given as
ρABA′B′ =
∑
iji′j′
|ij〉AB〈i′j′| ⊗Aiji
′j′
A′B′ , (190)
where Aiji′j′ are block matrices can be written as
ρABA′B′ =
∑
iji′j′
√
pijpi′j′ |ij〉AB〈i′j′| ⊗ [Uij
√
ρijE
√
ρi
′j′
E U†i′j′ ]T . (191)
To see this, we first write down its total purification:
ψABA′B′E =
∑
ij
√
pij |ij〉AB|ψij〉A′B′E . (192)
The states ψijA′B′E can be written as
ψijA′B′E =
dA′B′∑
k=1
λijk Vij |k〉A′B′ ⊗ UijW|k〉A′B′ (193)
Here Uij is unitary transformation acting on Eve’s system, Vij is unitary transformation acting on shield A′B′ and W is some
fixed embedding of HA′B′ into HE (this is needed if Eve’s systems are greater than the system A′B′):
W : HA′B′ → HE , W|k〉A′B′ = |k〉E (194)
where |k〉A′B′ , k = 1, . . . , dA′B′ is a fixed basis in system A′B′, while |k〉E , k = 1, . . . , dE is a fixed basis in system E. We
will also need a dual operation, which is fixed projection of space HE into HA′B′ :
W† : HE → HA′B′ , (195)
with
W†|k〉E = |k〉A′B′ for k = 1, . . . , dA′B′ (196)
W†|k〉E = 0 for k > dA′B′ (197)
One then finds that
(Aiji′j′)
T = V †ijW†U †ij
√
ρijE
√
ρi
′j′
E Ui′j′WVi′j′ (198)
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where T is matrix transposition. One can find, the operator U†ij ≡ UijWVij maps the space HA′B′ exactly onto a support of
ρi
′j′
E in space HE , and the dual operator Uij = V †ijW†U †ij maps the support of ρijE back to HA′B′ . Finally, our state is of the
form
ρABA′B′ =
∑
iji′j′
√
pijpi′j′ |ij〉AB〈i′j′| ⊗ [Uij
√
ρijE
√
ρi
′j′
E U†i′j′ ]T , (199)
which we aimed to show.
B. The proof of lemma 5, Section X-A.
We prove now that the states from a family that we have introduced in eq. (136), are indeed PPT for certain range of
parameters, as it is stated in lemma 5.
Proof: The matrix of the state (136) after partial transposition has a form
ρΓABA′B′ =


p( τ1+τ22 )
Γ 0 0 0
0 (12 − p)τΓ2 p( τ1−τ22 )Γ 0
0 p( τ1−τ22 )
Γ (12 − p)τΓ2 0
0 0 0 p( τ1+τ22 )
Γ

 . (200)
Since τ1 and τ2 are separable (and hence PPT), so is their mixture. Thus extreme-diagonal blocks of the above matrix are
positive. It remains to check positivity of the middle block matrix. Since any block matrix of the form[
A B
B A
]
, (201)
is positive if there holds A ≥ |B| where A and B are arbitrary hermitian matrices, our question of positivity of (200) reads
(
1
2
− p)τΓ2 ≥ p|(
τ1 − τ2
2
)Γ| (202)
Having ρs = 1d2+d (I + V ) and ρa =
1
d2−d (I − V ) where V swaps d-dimensional spaces and applying V Γ = dP+ one easily
gets that
τΓ1 =
(
P⊥+
d2 − 1
)⊗k
(203)
τΓ2 =
(
P⊥+
d2 + d
+
(1 + d)P+
d2 + d
)⊗k
(204)
where P⊥+ ≡ I − P+ is projector onto subspace orthogonal to the projector onto maximally entangled state P+ = |ψ+〉〈ψ+|.
We check then the inequality
(
1
2
− p)
(
P⊥+
d2 + d
+
(1 + d)P+
d2 + d
)⊗k
≥
≥ p
2
×
∣∣∣∣∣
(
P⊥+
d2 − 1
)⊗k
−
(
P⊥+
d2 + d
+
(1 + d)P+
d2 + d
)⊗k∣∣∣∣∣
(205)
To solve this inequality it is useful to represent the term on LHS as a sum:(
P⊥+
d2 + d
+
(1 + d)P+
d2 + d
)⊗k
=
(
P⊥+
d2 + d
)⊗k
+R (206)
where operator R is an unnormalised state which consists of all terms coming out of k-fold tensor product of
(
P⊥+
d2+d +
(1+d)P+
d2+d
)
apart from the first term
(
P⊥+
d2+d
)⊗k
. It is good to note that R has support on subspace orthogonal to (P⊥+ )⊗k. This fact allows
to omit the modulus and to get
(
1
2
− p)
[(
P⊥+
d2 + d
)⊗k
+R
]
≥
≥ p
2
[
(P⊥+ )
⊗k
(
1
(d2 − 1)k −
1
(d2 + d)k
)
+R
]
(207)
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Since R and (P⊥+ )⊗k are orthogonal, this inequality is equivalent to the following two inequalities
(
1
2
− 3
2
p)R ≥ 0 (208)
(
1
2
− p)
(
P⊥+
d2 + d
)⊗k
≥ p
2
(P⊥+ )
⊗k ×
×
(
1
(d2 − 1)k −
1
(d2 + d)k
)
(209)
To save first inequality one needs p ≤ 13 . Preserving the second one requires
1− p
p
≥
(
d
d− 1
)k
(210)
This however is fulfilled for any p ∈ (0, 13 ] if d is taken properly large for some fixed k. Indeed, the k-th root of 1−pp (which
converges to 1 with k) can be greater than d
d−1 (which converges to 1 with d) for some large d.
C. Comparison of two criteria for secure key
In this section, we shall compare the joint cryptographic criterion, i.e. the requirement of (112):
||ρccqreal − ρccqideal|| ≤ ǫ (211)
which includes both uniformity and security in one formula with the double condition where uniformity and security are treated
separately, namely:
χ({pi, ρEij}) ≤ ǫ (212)
||ρAB − ρABideal|| ≤ ǫ
The connection between these two criteria for quantum cryptographical security of the state is given in the theorem below.
Theorem 10: For any ccq state ρABE =
∑d−1
ij=0 pij |ij〉〈ij| ⊗ ρEij and ρideal =
∑d−1
i=0
1
d
|ii〉〈ii| ⊗ ρE where ρE =
∑
ij pijρ
E
ij ,
the following implications holds:
||ρAB − ρABideal|| ≤ ǫ
χ(ρABE) ≤ ǫ
}
⇒ ||ρABE − ρideal|| ≤ ǫ+
√
ǫ (213)
||ρABE − ρideal|| ≤ ǫ⇒
{
χ(ρABE) ≤ 4ǫ log d+ h(ǫ)
||ρAB − ρABideal|| ≤ ǫ.
(214)
where ρAB = TrEρABE , ρABideal = TrEρideal.
Remark 4: We see that the result (214) is not fully satisfactory due to the term log d. However, one cannot get a better
result. Indeed it is easy to construct a state, for which the Holevo function is of ǫ log d order, though the state ρABE is ǫ close
to some ρideal state. As an example may serve an appropriate extension of the isotropic state, measured in computational basis:
ρABE = (1− ǫ)(
d−1∑
i=0
1
d
|ii〉〈ii|AB)⊗ (|00〉〈00|)E +
+ǫ
∑
i6=j
1
d2 − d |ij〉〈ij|AB ⊗ (|ij〉〈ij|)E (215)
where σ is maximally mixed state. If we consider now ρideal = (
∑d−1
i=0
1
d
|ii〉〈ii|AB) ⊗ (|00〉〈00|)E , it is easy to see that
||ρABE − ρideal|| = 2ǫ. However the value of the Holevo function equals h(ǫ) + ǫ log(d2 − d).
Remark 5: The main difficulty in the proof of the above theorem is to get the term log d (d×d is size of AB system) rather
than log dABA′B′ . The latter one would be obtained directly from Fannes type continuities. However to get log d we have to
apply tricks based on twisting. It is quite convenient not to have Eve’s dimension in equivalence formula. This is because Eve’s
dimension depends on the protocol that lead to the key (more specifically, it depends on the amount of communication). In
contrast, dimension of Alice and Bob system is only the number of bits of obtained key. Thus, our equivalence is independent
of the protocol.
Proof: For the first part of the theorem 10 we assume that χ({pij , ρEij}) ≤ ǫ which by proposition 7 in Sec. XV-D of
Appendix means that we have:
||
d−1∑
i,j=0
pij |ij〉〈ij|AB ⊗ ρEij −
d−1∑
i,j=0
pij |ij〉〈ij|AB ⊗ ρE || ≤
√
ǫ, (216)
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with ρE =
∑d−1
i,j=0 pijρ
E
ij . Moreover by second assumption that
||
d−1∑
i,j=0
pij |ij〉〈ij| −
d−1∑
i
1
d
|ii〉〈ii|)|| ≤ ǫ (217)
one gets
||
d−1∑
i,j=0
pij |ij〉〈ij|AB ⊗ ρE −
d−1∑
i=0
1
d
|ii〉〈ii|AB ⊗ ρE || ≤ ǫ. (218)
Using triangle inequality, and Eqs. (216) and (218) one obtains the
||ρABE − ρideal|| ≤ ǫ+
√
ǫ. (219)
The proof of the second part of the theorem 10 is a bit more involved. Of course, it is immediate that due to monotonicity
of trace norm under partial trace, from ||ρABE − ρideal|| ≤ ǫ it follows ||ρAB − ρABideal|| ≤ ǫ. The non-obvious task is to bound
also χ. So, we assume that
||ρABE − ρideal|| ≤ ǫ, (220)
By equality of norm and fidelity condition (13), there holds
F (ρABE , ρideal) ≥ 1− 1
2
ǫ (221)
By definition of fidelity, there are pure states ψ and φ (purifications of ρABE and ρideal respectively), such that F (ψ, φ) =
F (ρABE , ρideal). Without loss of generality we can consider the system which purifies both states to be bipartite. We will
call it A′B′. Now let us perform twisting operation on the ABA′B′ parts of the pure states ψ and φ, which in the case of
state ρideal transforms AB subsystem of into maximally entangled state - P+d , (we can choose such twisting because by the
theorem 2 purification of an ideal state is some pdit state). I.e. after such twisting, pdit will become a basic pdit (9) which
is product with A′B′ subsystem. Since unitary transformation and tracing out can only increase fidelity, then applying again
(13) we have that subsystem AB of ρABE is close to a singlet state in norm:
||ρAB − P+d || ≤ 2
√
ǫ. (222)
Using Fannes inequality (see eq. 14 in Sec. II-A) we get
S(ρAB) ≤ 4
√
ǫ log d+ h(2
√
ǫ). (223)
Since the total state of systems ABA′B′E is pure, we get that S(ρA′B′E) = S(ρAB) hence
S(ρA′B′E) ≤ 4
√
ǫ log d+ h(2
√
ǫ). (224)
Now, note that the state of the system A′B′E has the form
ρA′B′E =
d−1∑
i,j=0
pijρ
A′B′E
ij , (225)
where the state ρA′B′Eij denotes state of A′B′E system after twisting and given that AB subsystem is in state |ij〉〈ij| (i.e. if
after twisting one measure the system AB in basis |ij〉 the system A′B′E would collapse to ρA′B′Eij ). By definition of Holevo
function there holds:
χ({pij , ρA
′B′E
ij }) ≤ S(ρA′B′E). (226)
The question is how the Holevo function of the {pij , ρA′B′Eij } ensemble is related to Holevo function of {pij , ρEij} which
we would like to bound from above. It is crucial, that by theorem 1 twisting operation does not affect the ccq state which
comes out of the measurement of AB in control basis of twisting. In other words, the ensemble {pi, ρEij} does not change
under twisting, so that ρEij = TrA′B′ρA
′B′E
ij . It is easy now to compare the functions χ({pij , ρEij}) and χ({pij , ρA
′B′E
ij }):
χ({pij , ρEij}) ≤ χ({pij , ρA
′B′E
ij }) (227)
This is due to the fact, that each state ρEij can be obtained from ρA
′B′E
ij by tracing out A′B′ subsystem. However tracing out
can only decrease Holevo function, because this function is equal to the average relative entropy:
χ({pk, ρk}) =
∑
k
pkS(ρk|
∑
k
pkρk). (228)
Summing up the chain of inequalities (224), (226) and (227) one gets
χ({pij , ρEij}) ≤ 4
√
ǫ log d+ h(2
√
ǫ). (229)
which is a desired security condition - bound on the Holevo function of the ansamble {pij, ρEij}.
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D. Useful inequalities relating security conditions
In this section we collect relations between different security conditions for ccq states. Some of these relations have been
studied in [3]. Since we will not deal with uniformity, but solely with security, it is convenient to use single index k in place
of ij. We thus consider ccq state (which could be actually called cq state)
ρ =
d2−1∑
k=0
pk|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρk (230)
Basing on this fact, we can state another lemma establishing some equivalences:
Lemma 8: For any state (230) and any positive real ǫ ≤ 12 , the following implications hold
1)
||
∑
k
pk|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρk − (
∑
j
pj |j〉〈j|) ⊗ ρ|| ≤ ǫ (231)
⇒
∑
k
pkF (ρk, ρ) ≥ 1− 1
2
ǫ
2) ∑
k
pkF (ρk, ρ) ≥ 1− ǫ⇒
∑
k
pk||ρk − ρ|| ≤ 8ǫ (232)
3) ∑
k
pk||ρk − ρ|| ≤ ǫ⇒ (233)
⇒ ||
∑
k
pk|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρk − (
∑
j
pj |j〉〈j|)⊗ ρ|| ≤ ǫ.
Here ρ =
∑
k pkρk.
Proof: The first thesis follows from the mentioned equivalence of norm and fidelity and definition of fidelity. Namely one
can make use of lemma 1, so that if (231) holds, the fidelity F (∑k pk|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρk, (∑j pj |j〉〈j|)⊗ ρ) is no less than 1− 12ǫ.
However it is equal to average fidelity
∑
k pkF (ρk, ρ). Indeed,
F (
∑
k
pk|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρk, (
∑
j
pj |j〉〈j|)⊗ ρ) = Tr
((∑
k
pk|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρk
) 1
2
∑
j
pj |j〉〈j| ⊗ ρ
(∑
l
pl|l〉〈l| ⊗ ρl
) 1
2
) 1
2
(234)
Now by orthogonality of vectors |k〉 one has√∑
k
pk|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρk =
∑
k
√
pk|k〉〈k| ⊗ √ρk. (235)
Multiplying now the (
∑
j pj |j〉〈j|)⊗ ρ matrix by the above from left-hand-side and right-hand-side one gets∑
k
p2k|k〉〈k| ⊗
√
ρkρ
√
ρk. (236)
This immediately gives the above formula equal to ∑
k
pkTr
√√
ρkρ
√
ρk (237)
which is just average fidelity from (232).
The second thesis of this lemma ( Eq. (232)) is again a consequence of (13). If applied to each pair ρk, ρ, and averaged
over probabilities of pk gives that ∑
k
pk
√
1− 1
4
||ρ− ρk||2 ≥ 1− ǫ (238)
which is equivalent to ∑
k
pk
(
1−
√
1− ||ρ− ρk||2/4
)
≤ ǫ. (239)
Now by the fact that
1−
√
1− 1
4
||ρ− ρk||2 (240)
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is a convex function of ||ρ− ρk|| on interval (0, 2) we get
1−
√
1− 1
4
[
∑
k
pk||ρ− ρk||]
2 ≤ ǫ (241)
This however reads for 0 < ǫ < 1 ∑
k
pk||ρ− ρk|| ≤ 8ǫ. (242)
Since ||ρ− ρk|| ≤ 2 one has, that for ǫ ≥ 1 the above inequality is also valid, which completes the proof of the second thesis
of lemma 8.
The last implication (Eq. (233)) is a consequence of triangle inequality, which completes the lemma.
Let us notice, that this lemma establishes a kind of equivalance of security conditions, namely:
||
∑
k
pk|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρk − (
∑
j
pj |j〉〈j|)⊗ ρ|| ≤ ǫ (243)
⇒
∑
k
pk||ρ− ρk|| ≤ 4ǫ
⇒ ||
∑
k
pk|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρk − (
∑
j
pj|j〉〈j|) ⊗ ρ|| ≤ 4ǫ
We can show now links between the above conditions on ccq state and Holevo function χ of this state, i.e. of an ansamble
{pk, ρk} which we shall write χ(ρccq).
Lemma 9: For any ccq state ρccq (230) there holds:
χ(ρccq) ≤ ǫ⇒
∑
k
pk||ρk − ρ|| ≤
√
2ǫ (244)
∑
k
pk||ρk − ρ|| ≤ ǫ⇒ χ(ρccq) ≤ 3ǫ log d+max(h(ǫ), 2ǫ)
where
∑
k pkρk = ρ, which acts on Hilbert space H = Cd, and h(ǫ) = −ǫ log ǫ− (1− ǫ) log(1− ǫ) is binary entropy.
Proof: For the first statement of this lemma, let us notice that χ(ρccq) = S(ρ) −
∑
k pkS(ρk) is just equal to average
relative entropy distance
∑
k pkS(ρk|ρ). Thus, by assumption we have
χ(ρccq) =
∑
k
pkS(ρk|ρ) ≤ ǫ. (245)
Now we can make use of the inequality [45]:
1
2
||ρ− ρk||2 ≤ S(ρk|ρ) (246)
which after averaging over probabilities and by concavity of square root gives∑
k
pk||ρ− ρk|| ≤
√
2
∑
k
pkS(ρk|ρ). (247)
Applying now bound (245) we obtain ∑
k
pk||ρ− ρk|| ≤
√
2ǫ (248)
which completes first thesis of this lemma.
To prove the second statement of the lemma we use the Fannes inequality (see eq. 14 in Sec. II-A). Namely, for ||ρ−ρk|| ≤ 1
there holds:
|S(ρ)− S(ρk)| ≤ 2||ρ− ρk|| log d+ h(||ρ− ρk||). (249)
Let G = {k : ||ρ− ρk|| ≤ 1} and B = {k : ||ρ − ρk|| > 1}, and denote
∑
k∈G pk[S(ρ) − S(ρk)] ≡ χG(ρccq), and χB(ρccq)
analogously. We then have, that
χ(ρccq) = χG(ρccq) + χB(ρccq). (250)
We will give now the bounds for χG(ρccq) and χB(ρccq) respectively. The first quantity is directly bounded by the analogous
sum over LHS of the Fannes inequality:
χG(ρccq) ≤
∑
k∈G
pk
(
2||ρ− ρk|| log d+ h(||ρ− ρk||)
)
. (251)
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¿From assumption ∑
k
pk||ρ− ρk|| ≤ ǫ (252)
it follows that
∑
k∈G pk||ρ− ρk|| ≤ ǫ. Using this, and adding non-negative terms
∑
k∈B pkh(||ρ− ρk||), we get:
χG(ρccq) ≤ 2ǫ log d+
∑
k
pkh(||ρ− ρk||). (253)
Now by concavity of binary entropy one gets
χG(ρccq) ≤ 2ǫ log d+ h(
∑
k
pk||ρ− ρk||), (254)
Were the entropy increasing on [0,∞] interval, one could use directly the assumption that ∑k pk||ρ − ρk|| ≤ ǫ, and bound
h(
∑
k pk||ρ− ρk||) by h(ǫ). Since it is the case only for ǫ ∈ [0, 12 ], we have to end up with more ugly, but nonetheless useful
expression. Namely on the interval (12 ,∞] where the entropy becomes decreasing, it is bounded by 1, and hence not greater
than 2ǫ for ǫ ∈ (12 ,∞]. Thus finally one gets
χG(ρccq) ≤ 2ǫ log d+max(h(ǫ), 2ǫ), (255)
We turn now to give the bound for χB(ρccq). For the latter we use the fact, that the Holevo quantity is bounded from above
by log d, which gives:
χB(ρccq) ≤
∑
k∈B
pk log d. (256)
To bound the last inequality we observe, that by definition of the set B we have
∑
k∈B pk||ρ− ρk|| ≥
∑
k∈B pk. Then, again
by assumption (252), we have
χB(ρccq) ≤ ǫ log d. (257)
Collecting inequality (255) and the above one, we arrive at the formula
χ(ρccq) ≤ 3ǫ log d+max(h(ǫ), 2ǫ), (258)
which ends the proof of the lemma.
The lemmas above allow to prove the following proposition
Proposition 7: For any ccq state (230) the following holds:
χ({pk, ρk}) ≤ ǫ⇒
||
∑
k
pk|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρk − (
∑
j
pj |j〉〈j|)⊗ ρ|| ≤
√
2ǫ (259)
where ρ =
∑
k pkρk.
Proof: Assuming that Holevo function is smaller than ǫ, we get by lemma 9 that ∑k pk||ρk − ρ|| ≤ √2ǫ. This however
implies by lemma (8) that ||∑k pk|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρk − (∑j pj |j〉〈j|) ⊗ ρ|| is also not greater than √2ǫ, which completes proof of
the proposition.
E. Properties of pbits
We shall give here detailed proof of the lemma 3, Section IV-A.
Proof: Log-negativity [56] (cf. [59]) is defined as EN (ρ) = log(||ρΓ||). It is easy to see, that after partial transposition
on BB′ subsystem, the pbit γ in X-form changes into
γΓABA′B′ =
1
2


√
XX†
Γ
0 0 0
0 0 XΓ 0
0 (X†)Γ 0 0
0 0 0
√
X†X
Γ

 . (260)
We have
||γΓ|| = 1
2
(||[
√
XX†]Γ||+ ||[
√
X†X]Γ||+ ||A||), (261)
where
A =
[
0 (X)Γ
(X†)Γ 0
]
. (262)
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By assumption, the operators [XX†]Γ and [X†X ]Γ are positive, so that
||[
√
XX†]Γ||+ ||[
√
X†X]Γ|| = Tr(
√
XX† +
√
X†X)Γ = 2TrγΓ = 2. (263)
The last equality comes from the fact that Γ preserves trace. To evaluate norm of A, we note that due to unitary invariance of
trace norm we have ||A|| = ||σx ⊗ IA′B′A||. Consequently
||A|| = ||XΓ||+ ||(X†)Γ|| = 2||XΓ||. (264)
The last equality follows form the fact that Γ commutes with Hermitian conjugation, and trace norm is invariant under Hermitian
conjugation ||X || = ||X†||. Thus we get
EN (γ) = log(1 + ||XΓ||), (265)
which proves the lemma.
F. Relative entropy of entanglement and pdits
We give now the proof of the theorem 4, Section XV-F.
Proof: If one consider the thesis of theorem 3 for the state ρ = γ⊗nABA′B′ , it follows that
Er(ρ) ≤ log dn + 1
dn
dn−1∑
k=0
Er(σk), (266)
with k being the multiindex k = (i1, ..., in) with il ∈ {0, ..., d− 1} for l ∈ {1, ..., n} and σk = ρi1 ⊗ ...⊗ ρin . Dividing both
sides by n we obtain
1
n
Er(γ
⊗n
ABA′B′) ≤ log d+
1
ndn
dn−1∑
k=0
Er(σk), (267)
The left-hand-side of this inequality approaches E∞r (γ) with n. What has to be shown is that
lim
n→∞
1
ndn
dn−1∑
k=0
Er(σk) ≤
d−1∑
i=0
1
d
E∞r (ρi), (268)
with ρi denoting the conditional states on A′B′ subsystem.
Let us first observe that Er(σk) = Er(σk′ ) for any k and k′ which are of the same type, i.e. which has the same numbers
of occurrence of symbols from set {0, ..., d − 1}. This is because σk and σ′k differ by local reversible transformation which
does not change the entanglement. Moreover, as we will see, one can consider only those σk for which k is δ-strongly typical
i.e. such, that for some fixed δ > 0 there holds [16]:
∀a∈{0,...,d−1} |
a(k)
n
− 1
d
| < δ, (269)
where a(k) denotes frequency of symbol a in sequence k. The set of such k of length n we will denote as ST nδ . It is known,
that the strongly typical set carries almost whole probability mass for large n, that is for any δ > 0 and any ǫ > 0 there exists
n0 such that for all n ≥ n0:
P⊗n(ST nδ ) > 1− ǫ. (270)
Now, since we deal here with homogeneous distribution, we can say, that the probability of the set of events is directly related
to the power of this set. Namely we have:
|ST nδ |/dn > 1− ǫ, (271)
which gives |ST nδ | > (1− ǫ)dn.
We can rewrite now the term of the LHS of (268) as follows:
1
ndn
dn−1∑
k=0
Er(σk) =
1
ndn
( ∑
k∈STn
δ
Er(σk) +
∑
k 6∈STn
δ
Er(σk)
)
. (272)
We can get rid of the second term of the RHS of the above equality, because we can bound from above for each k the term
Er(σk) by n log d, which gives:
1
ndn
dn−1∑
k=0
Er(σk) ≤ 1
ndn
( ∑
k∈STδn
Er(σk) + n log d
∑
k 6∈STn
δ
) ≤ 1
ndn
∑
k∈STn
δ
Er(σk) + ǫ log d (273)
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Now for each k ∈ ST nδ we have
Er(σk) = Er(ρ
⊗m˜0
0 ⊗ ρ⊗m˜11 ⊗ ...⊗ ρ⊗m˜d−1d−1 ) (274)
with m˜i = i(k) with i in place of a in (269). By subadditivity of Er one has
Er(σk) ≤
d−1∑
l=0
Er(ρ
⊗m˜l
l ). (275)
Note, that ρl stands here for the state on shield part of one copy of γABA′B′ . Applying this inequality for each k in ST nδ and
taking maximum of LHS of the above inequality over k, we have a bound:
1
ndn
dn−1∑
k=0
Er(σk) ≤
d−1∑
l=0
1
n
Er(ρ
⊗ml
l ) + ǫ log d, (276)
where ml are the coefficients of the decomposition of some σk into ρ⊗ml , which yields the maximal value of Er(σk) over
all strongly typical k. Now, we can rewrite the RHS of the above inequality as:
d−1∑
l=0
ml
n
1
ml
Er(ρ
⊗ml
l ) + ǫ log d ≤ (
1
d
+ δ)
d−1∑
l=0
1
ml
Er(ρ
⊗ml
l ) + ǫ log d (277)
where the last inequality holds for sufficiently high n by assumption of strong typicality. Thus, for every δ and ǫ and sufficiently
large n there holds:
1
ndn
dn−1∑
k=0
Er(σk) ≤ (1
d
+ δ)
d−1∑
l=0
1
ml
Er(ρ
⊗ml
l ) + ǫ log d, (278)
One then sees, that the RHS approaches
(
1
d
+ δ)
d−1∑
l=0
E∞r (ρl) + ǫ log d (279)
in limit of large n. Indeed, since for every l the limit E∞r (ρl) exists, the subsequence 1mlEr(ρ
⊗ml
l ) approaches this limit.
Taking now infimum over δ and ǫ we prove the inequality (268). This proves the theorem 4.
G. Approximate pbits
We give here the proof of lemma 4
Proof: Assume first, that TrρABP+ > 1− ǫ. Since the elements aijkl are real, by hermicity of the state we have
TrρABP+ =
1
2
(a0000 + a1111 + 2Re(a0011)) (280)
This is however less than or equal to 12 (1 + 2a0011), which is in turn greater than 1 − ǫ, and the assertion follows. For the
second part of the lemma, assume that a0011 > 12 − ǫ. We then have
TrρABP+ >
1
2
(a0000 + a1111 + 1− 2ǫ).
We now bound the sum of a0000 and a1111. By positivity of the state, we have that
√
a0000a1111 > |a0011|. Now, by
arithmetic-geometric mean inequality, we have that a0000 + a1111 ≥ 2√a0000a1111 which gives the proof.
H. Relative entropy bound
Proof: (of Lemma 7, Section XI) Let us first show, that
TrP+d σAB ≤
1
d
(281)
for any σAB ∈ T . We first show this for σAB ”derived” from some pure product states |ψ〉〈ψ|:
σAB = TrA′B′U
†|ψ〉〈ψ|U. (282)
Because ψ is product, it can be written as
ψ = (
∑
ai|iA〉|ψi〉)⊗ (
∑
bi|iB〉|φi〉) (283)
with ai, bi normalized and |iA〉, |iB〉, |ψi〉, |φi〉 on subsystem A,B,A′, B′ respectively.
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Now the condition that the reduced AB state has overlap with P+d no greater than 1/d is∑
ij
aibia
∗
jb
∗
j〈xi|xj〉 ≤ 1 (284)
where xk are arbitrary vectors of norm one arising from the action of U on ψi and φi. Since the xk are arbitrary they can
incorporate the phases of ai, bi so that we require now
∑
ij
√
piqipjqj〈xi|xj〉 ≤ 1. where pi and qi are probabilities. Now,
the right hand side will not decrease if we assume 〈xi|xj〉 = 1 so we require [
∑
i
√
piqi]
2 ≤ 1 which is satisfied by any
probability distribution, which gives the proof of (281) for special σAB .
To show the inequality is true in general we find that
TrP+d TrA′B′U
†∑
k
pk|ψk〉〈ψk|U =∑
k
pkTrP
+
d TrA′B′U
†|ψk〉〈ψk|U. (285)
Thus if (281) holds for σAB derived from pure (product) state, by averaging over probabilities, we will have (281) for an
arbitrary σAB from the set T .
Now by concavity of logarithm, we have for any states ρ and σ:
S(ρ||σ) = −S(ρ)− Tr(ρ log σ) ≥
−S(ρ)− log(Trρσ) (286)
Applying inequality (281) we have that
− log(Trρσ) ≥ log d. (287)
Now by (286) we have that
S(P+d ||σAB) ≥ log d, (288)
which is a desired bound.
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